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Highlights 
 
 New philosophy-of-science paradigm to systematically study both individual-specific 
behaviours and pertinent representations. 
 A non-lexical taxonomic approach used to generate emic personality constructs. 
 Over 3 years and 6 waves, 104 crab-eating macaques macaques (Macaca fascicularis) 
and 99 human observers, experts and novices, studied. 
 Attribution biases reflecting socio-cultural stereotypes about age, sex, and social rank 
demonstrated in personality ratings. 
 Important implications for methodology and research methods, in particular limitations of 
questionnaire methods, illuminated. 
 
Abstract 
 
Socio-cognitive abilities to recognise and to represent individual-specificity—even in some 
nonhuman species—are central to human life. Using a novel philosophy-of-science 
paradigm, we explored these abilities over 3 years in 6 waves by investigating individual-
specific behaviours of 104 crab-eating macaques (Macaca fascicularis) and the 
representations that 99 human observers—experts and novices—developed of them. By 
applying the non-lexical Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations Approach, we 
generated 18 macaque-specific personality constructs. They were operationalised with 
behavioural measures to study the macaques and with two rating formats to study the 
observers’ representations. Analyses of reliability, cross-method coherence, taxonomic 
structures, associations with demographic factors, and 12-24-month stabilities highlighted 
essential differences between individual-specific behaviours and pertinent representations, 
explored developmental pathways of representations, and illuminated attribution biases and 
limitations of questionnaire methods.  
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1. Theoretical Background 
Knowledge of people in general and of the ways in which individuals differ from one 
another plays a central role in human life. Person-related information is so important that 
gossiping about who-is-doing-what-with-whom makes up about two thirds of conversation 
time (Dunbar, 1996) and occurs in all human cultures (Brown, 1991). Everyday knowledge of 
individuals is mentally represented in constructs that people develop to describe, to 
integrate, and to explain their experiences with their social worlds (Kelly, 1955; Valsiner, 
2012). By communicating their experiences and personal constructs and by negotiating 
shared meanings, people create socio-culturally shared ideas, values, and beliefs that are 
represented in social constructs—that is, they develop social representations (Jovchelovitch, 
2007; Moscovici, 1984). Over time, representations of those individual differences that are 
perceived as most salient and that are considered to be socially relevant in particular 
communities become encoded in their everyday languages (John, Angleitner, & Ostendorf, 
1988). 
Constructs of personality differences and their lexical encodings are essential socio-
cognitive tools that people intuitively use to quickly form impressions of others (cf. Asch, 
1946) based on category systems that have proven to be socially significant within their 
communities (Goldberg, 1981). Personality constructs are like glasses through which 
humans peer into their social worlds. They allow people to gain some cognitive control of 
social interactions with other individuals in their communities—but also with strangers (cf. 
McAdams, 1994). Dealing with strangers is so pervasive in the everyday lives of present-day 
humans in large societies that, at first sight, this remarkable ability does not appear to be 
special in any way. But, in fact, it may be uniquely human (Blaffer-Hrdy, 2009), at least when 
only mammalian species are considered. In other (non-domesticated) mammals, encounters 
with strangers regularly result in automatic attack—even in our closest living relatives, the 
nonhuman primates. “Compared with our nearest ape relations, humans are more adept at 
forestalling outright mayhem. Our first impulse usually is to get along” (p. 3).  
It has therefore been argued that the abilities to recognise and to mentally and socially 
represent abstract ideas of how individuals generally behave and differ from one another first 
enabled our human ancestors to deal with unknown others in peaceful ways (the personality-
constructs-promote-peaceful-anonymous-contacts hypothesis; Uher, 2013). These abilities 
could have been essential prerequisites for peaceful traffic, exchange, and trade among 
different socio-cultural communities—behaviours of enormous importance in human 
evolution. Given this and given our current state of knowledge of other species’ pertinent 
abilities (see below), the mental construction and social representation of personality 
differences in and of themselves seem to be uniquely human as well (Uher, 2013). 
Most personality constructs that people develop refer to human conspecific individuals. 
But they are not restricted to them. Humans also recognise and represent individual 
differences of some other species—and have done so for several tens of thousands of years 
already. Evidence comes from an impressive 40-year breeding experiment aimed at 
replicating processes of animal domestication with farm foxes. In these canids, strong 
selective breeding for a specific behavioural pattern called tamability (i.e., low fearfulness of 
and low aggressiveness to humans) over just 30-35 generations resulted in a host of 
changes in genes, morphology, physiology, and behaviour (including non-selected, intra-
specific social behaviour) in which the present-day’s domesticated species differ markedly 
from their wild relatives. These exciting results suggest that the key factors of artificial 
selections that humans have imposed on some species during domestication consisted of 
individual behaviours rather than size or reproductive capacity (Belyaev, 1969; Trut, 1999).  
Animal domestication—one of the most important developments in recent human 
history (Diamond, 2002)—thus presupposed that our human ancestors were able to 
recognise, mentally construct, and socially represent meaningful individual differences in the 
behaviour of some nonhuman species. Palaeolithic dog fossils in Europe dated back to 
30,000 years ago (Germonpré, Sablin, Stevens, et al., 2009) suggest that humans had to 
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have already developed these abilities by that time. Pertinent representations and semiotic 
symbols referring to human individuals had very likely already been developed before (Uher, 
2013).  
The present article explores these remarkable human abilities using a novel research 
paradigm. This paradigm provides an elaborated philosophy-of-science framework for 
personality psychology (Uher, 2013). It embarks on a new research strategy by scrutinising 
these socio-cognitive abilities from meta-theoretical viewpoints and by clearly differentiating 
the different kinds of phenomena that are constructed as personality. This highlights 
important implications for research methodology and investigatory methods that are still not 
well considered in personality psychology.  
 
1.1 The new research paradigm: Meta-theoretical foundations  
Elementary to the new research paradigm are meta-theoretical definitions of the 
phenomena under study, in particular of behaviour. In psychology, definitions of behaviour 
are rarely discussed and the few proposed are only operational or nominal (e.g., Furr, 2009). 
The meta-theoretical definition of behaviour as “external activities or externalisations of living 
organisms that are functionally mediated by the environment (Millikan, 1993) in the present” 
(Uher, 2013) emphasises that behaviour is inherently bound to the present—and thus 
requires realtime measurement. Externality differentiates behavioural phenomena from 
psychological phenomena, which are also bound to the present, but are phenomena entirely 
internal to the individual. Psychological phenomena can be directly perceived only in oneself 
through introspection (Wundt, 1904), but not in other individuals (Locke, 1689; Toomela, 
2008, 2011). In other individuals, people can directly perceive only behaviours and outer 
appearances. Psychological phenomena of others, by contrast, can be inferred only from 
their externalisations, and in particular from behaviour, including parts of language (Uher, in 
prep. a). But these externalisations may not reflect psychological phenomena, their qualities, 
or their structures unequivocally or accurately (Cervone, Shadel, & Jencius, 2001; Lewin, 
1935; Toomela, 2011). The complex interrelations between behavioural and psychological 
phenomena can be untangled only if these different kinds of phenomena are explored each 
in its own right and if a priori assumptions about specific interrelations are avoided. This is 
still rarely done in psychology (Uher, 2013). 
Behaviours (and psychological phenomena as well) are not only bound to the present; 
they are also dynamic and highly fluctuating. This substantially hinders the recognition of 
patterns that are specific to individuals because, given these fluctuations, individual patterns 
can be only probabilistic. But behavioural (time-relative) probabilities that characterise all 
individuals of a particular population or species are not individual-specific. The probabilities 
must differ between individuals in stable ways across time periods that are longer than those 
in which the probabilities were first ascertained. Consequently, individual-specificity refers to 
patterns that are probabilistic, differential, and temporal (Uher, 2011a). Such patterns cannot 
be directly perceived. Their recognition requires repeated perceptions of events in many 
individuals over time and the mental abilities to perceive time and to memorise, to abstract, 
to (re-)construct, and to represent the experiences made (Uher, 2013).  
This complex constellation of abilities seems to be uniquely human. Individualised, 
non-kin-based dyadic relationships in some nonhuman species suggest that their individual 
members are able to mentally construct and represent behavioural regularities of specific 
individuals in their social worlds. But they may not be able to generate and mentally 
represent abstract ideas of how individuals generally behave and differ from one another 
over time, as humans are able to. Without such socio-cognitive category systems, 
nonhuman individuals cannot quickly form impressions of other individuals, and interactions 
with strangers are highly unpredictable. This may contribute to the enormous social tension 
and frequent aggression that we can typically observe in encounters between strangers in 
nonhuman (non-domesticated) mammals. The abilities of humans to develop social 
representations of personality differences and pertinent lexical symbols—which substantially 
facilitate exchange between individually constructing minds and thus the propagation of 
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socially shared ideas (Lahlou, 1996)—may therefore have played important roles in human 
evolution (see above; Uher, 2013). 
The mental and social processes that are involved in the recognition and construction 
of individual-specificity entail that personality constructs do not refer only to phenomena that 
are perceivable in other individuals (i.e., to behaviours including parts of language and outer 
appearances). Rather, they typically also involve interpretations, appraisals, and 
explanations of possible causes and consequences of the recognised patterns—particularly 
in terms of psychological phenomena and environmental factors. These ideas, values, and 
beliefs are intrinsically embedded into the socio-cultural contexts of particular communities 
(Wagner, Farr, Jovchelovitch, et al., 1999). The pertinent everyday language terms are 
therefore loaded with implicit meanings that likely vary socio-culturally (Neuman, Turney, & 
Cohen, 2012). Consequently, representations of personality differences are far more than 
mere reflections of individual-specific behaviours and outer appearances. They are 
constructions of new realities—social realities—that are essentially different kinds of 
phenomena. 
The new research paradigm (Uher, 2013) considers this and explicitly differentiates a) 
behavioural phenomena and other ecto-phenotypical phenomena such as outer 
appearance, b) internal, especially psychological phenomena, c) external environmental 
phenomena, in particular those that are functionally mediating behaviours (see above) and 
that are defined as environmental situations (Uher, in prep. a), and d) pertinent 
representations that people develop of all of this. The clear differentiation of these different 
kinds of phenomena and the meta-theoretical analyses of their different theoretical natures 
point to important implications for research methodology and investigatory methods.  
Specifically, behaviours (and outer appearances) and environmental situations are 
exterospectively accessible. In these phenomena, the demarcation of entities and their 
encodations as data can therefore be explicitly defined. The particular elements of the set B 
of behaviours, (the set O of outer appearances), the set S of environmental situations in 
which these occurred, the set T of occasions and spans of time, and the set I of individuals 
that are considered in quantifications of individual-specificity are thus explicitly known. If 
realtime measurements are accumulated over time using the concept of time-relative 
probabilities (for details, see Uher, 2013), this allows for ratio-scaled and—in set-theoretic 
regards—objective quantifications of individual-specificity (Uher, in prep. b). A 
comprehensive empirical application of these concepts to individual-specific behaviours 
based on 146 contextualised behavioural variables can be found in Uher, Addessi, and 
Visalberghi (2013).  
This is not possible for the pertinent representations, however, because these are 
inherently subjective and intersubjective phenomena respectively (Jovchelovitch, 2007; 
Moscovici, 1984). Because they are not exterospectively accessible, the demarcation of 
entities in these phenomena cannot be explicitly defined. The processes of perception, 
memorisation, abstraction, and mental and social construction that are involved in the 
development of representations of individual-specificity entail that the particular elements of 
the sets B,(O), S, T, and I that people implicitly consider in their constructs of personality 
cannot be traced anymore. They are unknown as are the elements of the sets of 
interpretations, appraisals, and explanations that personality constructs inherently comprise 
(for detailed discussions, see Uher, 2013). 
Judgements of personality require people to directly quantify individual-specificity. But 
individual-specificity is not a phenomenon of the present because it refers to probabilistic 
and temporal patterns (see above) that inherently involve events of the past. Consequently, 
individual-specificity cannot be directly perceived at a present moment—and thus cannot be 
directly quantified. To fulfil the requirements of personality judgements, people must 
necessarily rely on their pertinent representations. Thus, when judging a particular individual, 
we do not know which particular elements of the above-mentioned sets of elements judges 
implicitly consider and how these elements are demarcated and converted into data (cf. 
Rosenbaum & Valsiner, 2011). It follows that judgements of individual-specificity can 
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provide—in set-theoretic regards—only subjective quantifications that are at best ordinal-
scaled (Uher, in prep. b, 2013).  
 
1.2 A non-lexical emic approach for taxonomic investigations  
These insights have important implications for taxonomic research, which has been 
based almost exclusively on judgements and in many cases on lexical approaches so far. 
They highlight that important taxonomic models of human personality differences capture 
representations that people have developed of individual differences and therefore 
inherently comprise ideas, values, and beliefs that likely vary socio-culturally (see above). 
But there is still little scientific description of the individual differences that particular socio-
cultural communities perceive to be salient and consider to be socially relevant and of the 
factors and processes that shape the development of pertinent everyday language terms 
(John et al., 1988). Personality psychologists still do not know how well lexically derived 
models represent perceivable individual differences, the ways in which they may reflect 
different perceptions, interpretations, and appraisals; and how perceivable individual 
differences actually vary within and between different socio-cultural and language 
communities (Block, 2010; Uher, 2013).  
For comprehensive taxonomic investigations of and systematic comparisons between 
individual-specific behaviours and people’s pertinent representations, a new methodological 
approach has been developed that is grounded in the philosophy-of-science framework of 
the new paradigm—the Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations Approach 
(BRxES-Approach; Uher, 2008a, b, 2011a, b). This approach is a non-lexical emic/bottom-up 
approach (i.e., a manifest system approach; see Uher, under review) that allows researchers 
to systematically generate personality constructs from within the known behavioural 
repertoire of a population—both human and nonhuman. It breaks the generation of 
constructs of individual-specificity down to observational concepts of behaviours and of 
environmental situations that scientists have already described for the average individual of 
a study population (see Section 2.3). These hypothetically generated constructs serve to 
systematically guide the researchers’ selections of what to study to allow for comprehensive 
taxonomic investigations. On the one hand, these constructs can be used to taxonomise 
individual-specific behaviours of a given population (e.g., of a socio-cultural community or a 
species); for this purpose they are operationalised in behavioural measurements. On the 
other hand, BRxES-Approach-generated constructs can be used to study the representations 
that a specified group of people have developed of the individual-specific behaviours of a 
given (human or nonhuman) population. For this purpose, the constructs can be 
operationalised, for example, by rating items that describe their content in the particular 
language of the raters under study.  
Like any research, the BRxES-Approach necessarily relies on human language. But in 
contrast to lexical approaches, its rationale of selection is not guided by the everyday 
language terms in which particular socio-cultural communities have encoded their pertinent 
representations. Instead, it is based on scientific terms, descriptions, and categorisations of 
the known behavioural repertoire of the population under study. Construct labels are 
therefore less colloquial than those derived from everyday languages. Moreover, 
representations typically comprise—accurately or not—causal assumptions (see above). 
Perhaps for this reason, lexically derived constructs are frequently—but erroneously—
attributed a causal status (Bock, 2000; Komatsu, 2012; Lamiell, 2003; Mischel & Shoda, 
1994; Uher, 2013). Following the clear differentiation of behaviours from both causally 
related internal and external phenomena and from pertinent representations, the BRxES-
Approach generates descriptive constructs that are not attributed a causal status (Uher, 
2011a). This allows for the generation of comprehensive structural-descriptive knowledge of 
individual-specific behaviours that can systematically guide and meaningfully complement 
research on causally related phenomena, particularly psychological ones.  
 
Uher, J., Werner, C. S., & Gosselt, K. (2013). From observations of individual behaviour to social representations  
of personality: Developmental pathways, attribution biases, and limitations of questionnaire methods.  
Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 647–667. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.03.006 
 
www.primate-personality.net  
7/44
1.3 Essential differences between research on individual-specific behaviours and 
research on pertinent representations 
The philosophy-of-science perspective of the new paradigm also highlighted 
differences in the properties of the data that can be obtained from these different kinds of 
phenomena. Specifically, individual-specific behaviours may not be as consistent as 
people’s judgements of them. Behavioural data need not fulfil the psychometric standards 
established for judgement-based research (Uher et al., 2013). This is a reflection of the well-
known facts that individual-specificity in behaviour emerges at the fine-grained levels of 
individually distinct yet stable behavioural profiles across situations (e.g., Mischel, 1977) and 
across different functionally related behaviours within a situation (e.g., Asendorpf, 1988). 
These patterns entail that, on the sample level, the cross-situational consistency of individual 
behaviour (Mischel, 1968) and the consistency between functionally related behaviours can 
be only moderate (Asendorpf, 1988). These phenomena have also been shown in 
nonhuman primates (Stevenson-Hinde, Stillwell-Barnes, & Zunz, 1980; Uher, 2011a, 2011b, 
Uher et al., 2008; Uher et al., 2013).  
The patterns of (in)consistency in behavioural phenomena are not readily apparent in 
judgement-based research. In their experiences with their worlds, people strive to detect 
recurrent patterns that may enable the predictions of events (Kelly, 1955) while they are 
facing the uncertainty of the future (the so-called ecological necessity of abstraction; 
Valsiner, 2012). They may therefore develop somewhat coherent representations that are 
consistent with the logic of the human mind and with socio-cultural belief systems—yet not 
necessarily with the phenomena that are being represented (Daston & Galison, 2007; Uher, 
2013). The impact of mental and social processes on the structure of judgement-based data 
of individual differences has received only little consideration so far (Diriwächter, Valsiner, & 
Sauck, 2005; Rosenbaum & Valsiner, 2011; Schwarz, 1999; Uher et al., 2013).  
Additionally, judgement scales of personality inventories and lexically derived 
constructs are developed by selecting only those variables that yield empirical data 
structures with high internal consistency in the target population—and that thus measure 
redundancies (Block, 2010). In everyday language, redundancies can be easily created at 
low cost (cf. Lahlou, 1996) and are therefore comparably widespread. But in behaviour, 
redundancies may be rare. They may even be constrained because they are too costly in 
ecological and evolutionary regards. 
The BRxES-Approach considers these peculiarities of behavioural phenomena and 
allows researchers to employ a two-step procedure to explore taxonomic structures of 
individual-specific behaviours. In the first step, the behavioural data are aggregated on the 
level of the generated constructs (see Section 2.3). This reduction is based on the 
scientifically established functions of the studied behaviours—regardless of potentially low 
internal consistencies between their measurements. In the second step, these theoretically 
derived construct measures are statistically analysed for taxonomic structures. The first step 
corresponds to the processes of mental abstraction and construction on the part of human 
observers, but is, in contrast to them, made explicit and based on scientific knowledge. It can 
thus be traced to the specific behaviours and situations that are considered in these 
measures (see above, Uher, 2013).  
The BRxES-Approach has already been successfully applied to investigate individual-
specific behaviours of capuchin monkeys (Uher et al., 2013) and of great apes (Uher, 
Asendorpf, & Call, 2008) and to investigate the representations that human observers (i.e., 
keepers) have developed of great ape individuals (Uher, 2011b; Uher & Asendorpf, 2008). 
To investigate both kinds of phenomena, it was also applied in the present study. 
 
1.4 The present research 
This study explored the human abilities to quickly form impressions of nonhuman 
individuals. Because domesticated animals have been selected and bred for physical and 
behavioural properties and performances that humans can easily perceive and thus well 
represent and because knowledge of these animals is widespread in the public, we studied 
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crab-eating macaques (Macaca fascicularis), a nonhuman primate species endemic to 
Southeast Asia, in a sample that has been kept in The Netherlands, Europe. Crab-eating 
macaques, also called long-tailed macaques, cynomolgous, or Java monkeys, live in large 
groups with one or several males, many females, and their offspring. Their social structure is 
characterised by female matrilines, pronounced dominance hierarchies, and one alpha male 
leading the group (Angst, 1975). Their sex dimorphism is pronounced; females have about 
69% of average male weight (McDonald, 2001). These monkeys are opportunistic 
omnivores; they prey on vertebrates, invertebrates, and eggs. They wash food (Visalberghi 
& Fragaszi, 1990), swim under water, and use stone tools to crack open oysters, bivalves, 
crustaceans, and nuts (Gumert, Kluck, & Malaivijitnond, 2009). To our knowledge, 
comprehensive taxonomic investigations of the personality differences of this species are 
still missing. 
Nonhuman primates are among the most interesting species to study for individual-
specific behaviours because of their complex behavioural and social systems and their 
gradient of phylogenetic relatedness to humans—the primate species Homo sapiens. The 
nonhuman primates’ many striking similarities with us regularly prompt people to attribute 
anthropomorphic characteristics to them. But they also show many dissimilarities with 
human primates by which biased attributions become particularly apparent.  
To explore how quickly and accurately human observers may develop representations 
of individual crab-eating macaques, we investigated persons who were previously 
inexperienced with this species (i.e., novices) and persons who were well experienced with 
both this species and the particular individuals under study (i.e., experts). Using BRxES-
Approach-generated constructs, we studied the macaques’ individual-specific behaviours 
using ethological observations and the observers’ pertinent representations using personality 
judgements. We gave the novices five days of intense observation of just five target 
macaques kept in large social groups and then studied the representations that they 
developed from these limited observational experiences and those that the experts had 
developed based on their much broader experiences. We hypothesised that this brief time 
and the limited sample of individually known macaques would cause substantial differences 
in the novices’ agreement both with one another and with the experts. We used two formats 
of rating items that differed in their degree of abstraction from perceivable events to 
systematically explore how the observers represented the macaques’ individual-specific 
behaviours, how they may have developed their representations, and to illuminate possible 
attribution biases.  
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Macaque individuals 
We investigated 104 crab-eating macaques (Macaca fascicularis) at the Ethology 
Station of the Behavioural Biology Department, Utrecht University, The Netherlands. The 69 
females and 35 males were 1 to 33 years old (Mdn = 6.3; M = 8.1; SD = 6.6). The sample 
comprised 19 male and 24 female subadults (1-5 years), and 16 male and 45 female adults. 
The macaques lived in three groups of 39-42 (R-group), 34 (S-group), and 24-27 (T-group) 
individuals in spacious indoor and outdoor enclosures. They were always treated in 
accordance with the Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioural Research and 
Teaching (2006) and received their complete daily diets and permanent access to fresh 
water.  
 
2.2 Human observers: Experts and novices 
Two groups of human observers that differed in their levels of experience participated 
in this study. The experts were eight supervisors (all women) who were working at the 
Ethology Station. They had known the particular macaque individuals for several months up 
to several years. The novices were 91 undergraduate students (35 men, 56 women) who 
participated in ethology courses conducted at the Ethology Station. The novices were 
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previously inexperienced with this particular species, with the particular macaque individuals 
in the study, and with ethological observations.  
 
2.3 Non-lexical generation of emic working constructs of personality differences 
We applied the non-lexical BRxES-Approach (see Section 1.2, Uher, 2008a, b, 2011a, 
b) to systematically generate emic personality constructs that have high ecological validity 
for crab-eating macaques. First, we conducted a systematic review of 23 publications about 
the behavioural repertoire of captive and wild crab-eating macaques available at the start of 
our study (all references are listed in the Appendix). From these publications, we compiled a 
large table with all major behavioural categories (listed in one column) together with the 
categories of environmental situations in which these behaviours are described as 
commonly occurring (listed in a second column). Each row of the table thus represents a unit 
of a particular behavioural category and a particular associated situational category as 
described in a given publication; this is called a behaviourxsituation-unit in the BRxES-
Approach. The primary compilation of categories was designed to be overinclusive, 
repeatedly listing the same behaviours and situations. Then we reorganised the table such 
that categories describing the same or functionally similar behaviours were grouped 
together. We also organised the associated situational categories within the given 
behavioural categories. Finally, the behaviourxsituation-units were organised hierarchically 
according to the degrees of abstraction with which they describe the behaviours and 
situations.  
Using behaviourxsituation-units on moderate levels of abstraction that reflect relatively 
homogeneous subsets of still identifiable concrete behaviours and situations, we generated 
personality constructs by hypothetically assuming individual-specific patterns in the particular 
contextualised behaviours described. The thus-generated constructs (listed in a third table 
column) are therefore called working constructs. They serve methodological purposes to 
systematically guide the researchers’ decisions of what to study, but they do not a priori 
imply empirical usefulness. Given the over-inclusiveness of the compilation, the same 
working constructs were generated repeatedly in different parts of the category system. This 
is the essential prerequisite of the BRxES-Approach that enables researchers to 
systematically generate non-lexical emic personality constructs by considering the entire 
known behavioural repertoire of the population studied. In a second identical table, we then 
sorted the rows by the generated constructs and eliminated redundant enumerations of the 
same constructs to obtain a comprehensive overview of all generated constructs and the 
major behavioural and situational categories in which they describe individual-specificity. 
This construct generation process is described in more detail in Uher et al., (2013).  
According to the emic/bottom-up reasoning of the BRxES-Approach, all working 
constructs were constructed a priori to be unipolar in describing individual-specific 
behaviours of the same function (e.g., low to high Playfulness). Whether several working 
constructs can be constructed as representing opposite poles of a few more abstract 
taxonomic constructs that describe behavioural patterns of distinct functions (i.e., that are 
bipolar) is left to empirical investigation in each study population. For the present study on 
captive Java macaques, this procedure of the BRxES-Approach yielded 18 non-lexical emic 
personality constructs. Working constructs describing behaviours and situations that occur 
only in the wild, such as territoriality and travelling, could not be considered. We also had to 
exclude the construct “Food orientation” because the monkeys were fed outside observation 
hours.  
 
2.4 Multi-method operationalisations of working constructs  
The generated working constructs were operationalised systematically with different 
methods. To study the macaques’ individual-specific behaviours, behavioural measurements 
were obtained in ethological observations for most constructs. To study the observers’ 
representations, all 18 constructs were operationalised as trait-adjective and behaviour-
descriptive verb items for observer judgements on standardised scales.  
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2.4.1 Ethological observations (EO) 
In systematic ethological observations, data were collected on 34 social and non-social 
behaviours that regularly occur in the daily settings of captive species-typical social groups. 
All behaviours were described and defined in a comprehensive ethogram based on the 
established behaviour-scientific knowledge of crab-eating macaques (see Section 2.3; 
Appendix). A fixed observation schedule ensured that all target macaques were observed to 
the same extent. Within each Study wave (see Section 2.5), each target macaque was 
continuously observed in 17 focal individual time samples of 5 min each that were distributed 
evenly over five consecutive observation days; overall, 85 min per Study wave. The 
behavioural records comprised frequencies and durations; for the latter, one-zero records in 
15-sec time intervals were used to estimate the intervals that included any amount of time 
spent in the respective behaviours (Altmann, 1974). Laboratory-based experiments for non-
invasive behavioural testing of individuals that would have enabled the collection of 
ethological data for all BRxES-Approach-generated constructs were not possible. In total, we 
obtained one to six behavioural measurements in N = 101 individuals for 11 of the 18 
working constructs. 
 
2.4.2 Rating instruments: The Macaque Personality Inventory for captive populations 
(MPIc)—Trait-adjective items (TA) and Behaviour-descriptive verb items (BV)  
The items were phrased in the observers’ native language (Dutch). The number of 
items had to be minimised because the observers judged many (up to 37) macaque 
individuals. Moreover, the sample sizes of macaques that are sufficiently well known as 
individuals are extremely limited so that variables-to-cases ratios are generally 
compromised. In both item formats, judgements could be indicated on a 5-point frequency 
scale from (1) hardly ever, (2) rarely, (3) sometimes, (4) often, to (5) almost always. 
 Trait-adjectives (MPIc–TA). Each working construct was operationalised with one 
specific trait-adjective item that best described its content in the raters’ everyday language, 
yet without explicitly stating any specific behaviours or situations. For example, Curiousness 
was operationalised with “[Individual’s name] is curious”. Trait-adjectives are abstract words 
referring to representations that are distant from immediate perceptions of behavioural and 
situational events (see Section 1.). They therefore involve more complex processes of 
mental (re-)construction on the part of the raters than behaviour-descriptive verbs. In total, 
we constructed 18 trait-adjective items; none of them was reversed in meaning to avoid 
negations. 
Behaviour-descriptive verbs (MPIc–BV). Each working construct was operationalised 
with one to three verb-based sentences describing specific behaviours and situations that 
were directly based on the categories used to generate and to define the constructs (see 
Section 2.3). Behaviour-descriptive verb items specify concrete observable behavioural and 
situational events and therefore involve less complex construction and inference processes 
on the part of the raters than the abstract trait-adjectives. For example, Curiousness was 
operationalised with “[Name] intensely inspects new objects from close-by and/or touches 
them”. Most working constructs were operationalised with two items, seven constructs with 
one item, and one with three items. Overall, 30 behaviour-descriptive verb items were 
constructed, five of which could be reversed in meaning without using negations in the item 
wording. 
 
2.5 Procedures 
2.5.1 Ethological observations 
In the Ethology courses, the novices first learned about the theoretical and methodical 
foundations of ethological observation. Then they received practical training, and finally, they 
conducted their own ethological observations of the macaque individuals housed at the 
station. The novices worked together in pairs. Each pair jointly observed five target 
individuals from the same macaque group. Up to ten student pairs worked in parallel, thus 
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observing up to 50 macaques within one Study wave. The observations of each macaque 
group were supervised by two experts. They first trained the novice pairs to reliably identify 
their five target individuals and to systematically observe their behaviours using a 
comprehensive predetermined ethogram. Then the novices collected behavioural data on 
five consecutive days of intense and systematic ethological observation (see Section 2.4.1).  
 
2.5.2 Personality judgements 
Each novice pair and each expert pair provided judgements on the macaque 
individuals that they had observed. So that the novices would not focus on individual 
differences during their ethological observations, we asked the novices to provide 
personality ratings only after they had completed their ethological observations and when 
they no longer had access to the macaques. Observer judgements were collected via the 
Internet portal www.primate-personality.net. On a leaflet, we informed them about the rating 
procedure and the online access to the inventories. We explicitly cautioned all observers not 
to discuss their ratings with the other raters. Because all observers repeatedly provided 
judgements on the same items for different macaque individuals (the novices for 5 
macaques, the supervisors for up to 37 macaques), we presented the inventories in an 
interactive user interface (programmed by JU) that allowed for the personalised online-
presentation of items for each rater. It also inserted the name of the particular target 
macaque into the wording of each single item to help the raters focus on the particular 
individual being judged. All 18 trait-adjective items and all 30 behaviour-descriptive verb 
items were presented together in a fixed randomised order in chunks of five items per web 
page to avoid cross-checking between responses to items of related content. A similar 
computerised item presentation had already been successfully applied for keeper 
judgements of great ape individuals (Uher, 2011b; Uher & Asendorpf, 2008). All raters 
assessed their target macaques in a predetermined randomised order. Because each pair of 
novices pair and of experts judged the same set of individuals, one rater per pair provided 
judgements in alphabetical order of the macaques’ names, the other one in inverse order to 
avoid effects of familiarisation with the inventories on the ratings of single macaques.  
 
2.6 Study waves 
The study spanned three consecutive years of systematic multi-method data 
collection. In each year, we obtained data from ethological observations and personality 
ratings on both item formats from two ethology courses that were scheduled about three to 
four weeks apart. Overall, we collected data in six Study waves (t1-t6). Given the large 
number of macaque individuals per group (see Section 2.1), it was not possible to study all 
macaque groups in all Study waves. We observed the R-group in all six Study waves t1 to t6; 
the S-group in t1 to t4; and the T-group in t5 and t6. Thus, the number of macaques observed 
varied slightly between Study waves (72 in t1; 71 in t2; 62 in t3; 61 in t4; 59 in t5; 60 in t6). The 
experts provided ratings in both Study waves of Study year 1 to allow for analyses of test-
retest reliability analyses, and in one Study wave each of the Study years 2 and 3. Overall, 
up to four raters (i.e., each two novices in t1 to t6, and each two experts in t1, t2, t3, and t6) 
rated up to 50 macaques per Study wave. The experts also provided ratings on additional 
macaques that were not included in the behavioural data sets (see Section 2.4.2) and not 
rated by the novices; these were 52 macaques in Study wave t2 and 11 in t3. Thus, the 
number of macaque individuals rated varied between Study waves (45 macaques in t1; 97 in 
t2; 61 in t3; 44 in t4; 49 in t5; 51 in t6). 
 
2.7 Data aggregation and data analyses 
2.7.1 Technical terminology 
The philosophy-of-science research paradigm applied in this study adopts a more 
technical terminology than is common in contemporary personality research (Uher, 2013). A 
precise terminology is needed to refer unambiguously to the different phenomena studied 
(i.e., the macaques’ individual-specific behaviours and the representations that the human 
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observers developed of them) and to the different concepts with and the different levels of 
aggregation at which these are being described and analysed (e.g., behavioural 
measurements, behavioural composite construct measures, mean rating scores, see Section 
2.7.3). A glossary of the terms relevant to the present analyses is provided at the end of this 
article.  
 
2.7.2 Levels of aggregation 
Ethological observations. Within each Study wave, we first aggregated the behavioural 
raw data across the five observation days to obtain scores reflecting behavioural 
probabilities. Because they reflect different types of measure (e.g., frequencies, durations, 
see Section 2.4.1) and to obtain scores reflecting differential patterns in the probabilities to 
display these behaviours, we z-standardised the aggregate scores within each Study wave. 
The thus-derived behavioural measurements were then aggregated on the level of the 
working constructs into behavioural composite measures. To explore whether they reflect in 
fact individual-specificity (see Section 1.), both the single behavioural measurements and the 
composite construct measures were analysed for their test-retest reliability between the 
Study waves within each Study year. Finally, the behavioural composite construct measures 
were aggregated per Study year. 
Observer judgements. For both rating formats, we analysed the raw rating scores for 
interrater agreement within each Study wave. Thereafter, the rating scores for each 
macaque on each rating item were aggregated on different levels. First, mean rating scores 
per Study wave were computed separately for the different rater groups (i.e., experts and 
novices) and then averaged into mean combined scores of both rater groups. Thereafter, the 
mean scores of both rater groups were z-standardised over individuals within each Study 
wave and then aggregated into mean scores per Study year. For some analyses, the scores 
of the behaviour-descriptive verb ratings were further aggregated on the level of the BRxES-
Approach-generated constructs (reversing those of some items to share the same polarity). 
Finally, the mean scores of all single rating items were statistically summarised into rating 
factor scores.  
 
2.7.3 Analyses of behavioural data and of rating data 
On these different levels of aggregation, we explored our data matrices of i  individuals 
by j variables from the viewpoint of the variables and studied the i individuals’ score 
distributions on the j variables using variable-oriented analyses (Stern, 1911). We analysed 
interrater agreement within each Study wave, and test-retest reliability of the behavioural 
data and of the rating data between the Study waves of each Study year (Section 3.1). We 
studied cross-method coherence (Section 3.2) and explored how raters may have formed 
their adjectival judgements using mediation analysis (Section 3.3). Further, we investigated 
taxonomic structures of between-individual variations in the behavioural data and in the 
rating data and analysed the associations between these different data sets. On the level of 
BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs, we investigated associations of behavioural 
composite measures, behaviour-descriptive verb ratings, and trait-adjective ratings with the 
macaques’ demographic factors (Section 3.4). Finally, we studied the 12- and 24-month 
stabilities of the behavioural composite construct measures and of the rating factor scores 
(see Section 3.5).  
To compute mean correlations and to test correlation scores for differences between 
methods and rater groups, we always used Fisher’s r-to-Z transformation. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Reliability  
3.1.1 Behavioural measurements and behavioural composite construct measures (EO) 
The average reliability of the 34 behavioural measurements in terms of their test-retest 
reliability for the two Study waves of each Study year was rtt = .41 to .46 across all three 
Study years, ranging for single measurements from rtt = -.07 to .99. The average test-retest 
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reliability of the behavioural composite construct measures was rtt = .49 to .60, ranging for 
single measures from rtt = .05 to .93 (Table 1). In two of the three Study years, the test-retest 
reliability of composite measures was below rtt = .40 for the constructs Impulsiveness (rtt = 
.13 to .63) and Aggressiveness (rtt = .09 to .45). It was low in all three Study years for the 
constructs Anxiousness (rtt = .22 to .29) and Dominance (rtt = .05 to .39).  
 
3.1.2 Observer judgements on trait-adjective items (TA) and behaviour-descriptive 
verb items (BV) 
Mean level differences in the judgements provided for the individuals of the three 
macaque groups were absent; we therefore analysed the ratings of all macaques together. 
 
3.1.2.1 Interrater reliability 
Experts and novices showed substantial agreement in their judgements of the N = 104 
macaque individuals. Across all Study waves and both rating formats, the mean interrater 
reliability of the average raters (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) was for experts ICC(3,2) = .61; for 
novices ICC(3,2) = .62; and for all four raters from both rater groups ICC(3,4) = .72. Across 
both rater groups, the average interrater reliability of the trait-adjective ratings was ICC(3,k) 
= .66, virtually identical to that of the behaviour-descriptive verb ratings of ICC(3,k) = .64. 
Interrater agreement did not differ systematically between Study waves (see Table 2). For 
more direct comparisons between rater groups, we analysed the interrater reliability of the 
single raters. Across all Study waves and both rating formats, it averaged for experts 
ICC(3,1) = .46; for novices ICC(3,1) = .47; and for both rater groups combined ICC(3,1) = 
.42. On trait-adjective items, it was for experts ICC(3,1) = .44 and for novices ICC(3,1) = .49; 
for behaviour-descriptive verb items, it was for experts ICC(3,1) = .47 and for novices 
ICC(3,1) = .45. The small differences between rater groups and rating formats reflected in 
these average agreement scores were not significant within each Study wave. 
Interrater reliability was low or negative for some rating items in some Study waves 
and for some rater groups, such as for the behaviour-descriptive verb items “In uncertain 
situations, [Name] yawns or scratches him/herself” operationalising Arousability, ICC(3,1) = -
.17 to .32; and “[Name] can occupy him/herself with something for a long time” 
operationalising Persistence, ICC(3,1) = .00 to .22; and for the trait-adjective item “[Name] is 
cleanly with him/herself” operationalising cleanliness, ICC(3,1) = .07 to .28. But no rating 
item lacked interrater reliability in general in all Study waves or for all rater groups.  
 
3.1.2.2 Test-retest reliability 
We analysed the mean ratings at the level of the Study waves for their test-retest 
reliability within each Study year. Test-retest reliabilities for novice ratings refer to all three 
Study years; those for expert ratings and for the combined ratings of the two rater groups 
only to Study year 1 (see Section 2.6). Across the two item formats, the average test-retest 
correlation for expert ratings (mean of 2 raters) was r = .78; for combined ratings (mean of 4 
raters), it was r = .74; and for novice ratings (mean of 2 raters), it was r = .48. Novice ratings 
showed significantly less test-retest reliability than expert ratings, t(47) = 10.093-13.595; p = 
.000, and than combined ratings, t(47) = 7.920-15.666; p = .000.  
Recall that in both Study waves of Study year 1, all expert ratings were provided by the 
same persons, whereas novice ratings were provided by different persons in every Study 
wave. To test for possible effects that this difference may have had on the test-retest 
reliability of the expert ratings, we computed cross-correlations between the different rater 
groups (each derived from two raters) within each Study year (i.e., expert t1-novice t2, novice 
t1-expert t2, expert t3-novice t4, novice t5-expert t6). Their average test-retest correlation 
across the two item formats and all Study years was r = .58 (see Table 2). The test-retest 
correlations of expert ratings were significantly higher than those between different rater 
groups for both trait-adjective ratings, t(17) = 3.098-9.018; p = .000-.007, and behaviour-
descriptive verb ratings, t(29) = 6.957-12.226; p = .000, in all cases. These cross-
correlations, in turn, tended to be significantly higher than the test-retest correlations 
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between novice ratings. For trait-adjective ratings, these differences were significant for one 
expert-novice cross-combination in Study year 1 and one in Study year 2, t(17) = 2.141-
4.168; p = .001-.047. For behaviour-descriptive verb ratings, these differences were 
significant in all three Study years except for one expert-novice cross-combination in Study 
year 1, t(29) = 2.636-7.878; p = .000-.013.  
Across all rater groups and Study years, average test-retest reliability did not 
systematically differ between trait-adjective items, rTA =.61, and behaviour-descriptive verb 
items, rBV = .58 (see Table 2). Four items lacked test-retest reliability in all Study waves and 
in all rater groups; these were the behaviour-descriptive verb items “In uncertain situations, 
[Name] yawns or scratches him/herself” operationalising Arousability (rtt =.34 for experts; rtt = 
.21 for all raters; rtt = .09-.49 for novices); “[Name] can occupy him/herself with something for 
a long time” operationalising Persistence (rtt =.27 for experts; rtt = .01 for all raters; rtt = -.12 
to .24 for novices); “[Name] cleans his/her skin, fur, and wounds” operationalising 
Cleanliness (rtt = .27 for experts; rtt =.20 for all raters; rtt = -.14 to .38 for novices), and the 
trait-adjective item “[Name] is cleanly with him/herself” also operationalising Cleanliness (rtt = 
-.05 for experts; rtt =.04 for all raters; rtt =.03 to .27 for novices). Given their lack of test-retest 
reliability, we excluded these items from subsequent analyses.  
 
3.1.3 Comparison of temporal reliability between the macaques’ individual-specific 
behaviours and the judgements of the different rater groups  
The parallel collection of behavioural data and of rating data from different rater groups 
on the same personality constructs for the same sample of macaque individuals permits 
direct comparisons of their temporal reliability. We compared the test-retest correlations of 
expert ratings, novice ratings, combined ratings, and the cross-correlations between the 
different rater groups on trait-adjective items and behaviour-descriptive verb items with those 
of the behavioural composite construct measures. This latter set of measures was studied 
because these composites reflect the highest level of aggregation in the behavioural data. 
Their level of abstraction from perceivable behavioural events is therefore more comparable 
to that of the rating data than the level of abstraction of the single behavioural 
measurements. We tested the differences in test-retest reliability for significance using t-
tests for independent samples and analysed their magnitude with Cohen’s effect size based 
on pooled standard deviations (Cohen, 1992). We used the scores of Study year 1 in which 
the largest samples were obtained for all methods.  
The test-retest reliability of expert ratings and of the combined ratings was significantly 
higher than that of the behavioural measures for both trait-adjective ratings, t(27) = 2.399-
2.722; p = .011-.024, and behaviour-descriptive verb ratings, t(39) = 2.512-3.962; p = .000-
.016. The magnitude of these differences for expert ratings and for the combined ratings of 
trait-adjective items was d = 1.04 and d = .92 respectively; and for behaviour-descriptive 
verb items, it was d = .86 and d = 1.33, respectively. A further significant yet inverse 
difference was found for the novices’ behaviour-descriptive ratings in Study year 2, t(39) = -
3.422; p = .001. In this exceptional case, the rating data showed substantially less test-retest 
reliability than the behavioural data (d = -1.16). No further differences in temporal reliability 
were found for either novice ratings or for cross-correlations between rater groups. Thus, 
only test-retest correlations of scores involving expert ratings in both Study waves of a given 
Study year were significantly higher than those of the behavioural measures. But this was 
not the case if expert ratings were involved in just one of the two Study waves compared. 
 
3.2 Validity of observer representations: Cross-method coherence on the level of 
working constructs 
We explored the relationships between the macaques’ individual-specific behaviours 
and the observers’ pertinent representations on the level of BRxES-Approach-generated 
working constructs in terms of the coherence between their behavioural composite 
measures and the two judgement-based measures (i.e., trait-adjective ratings and 
behaviour-descriptive verb ratings). The latter were analysed jointly for both rater groups 
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using the combined ratings of Study year 1. Across all working constructs studied, 
coherence between these three methods in terms of Pearson correlations (r) was substantial 
and differed significantly from zero in one-sample t-tests, tTA–BV (17) = 7.99, p < .001; tTA–EO 
(10) = 6.50, p < .001; tBV–EO (10) = 10.69, p < .001 (for details, see Table 3). The strength of 
coherence between methods differed significantly such that, across constructs, the 
correlations between the two rating methods (mean rTA–BV = .79) were significantly higher 
than those between trait-adjective ratings and behavioural measures (mean rTA–EO = .45; t TA-
BV – TA-EO (10) = 3.46; p < .001) and than those between behaviour-descriptive-verb ratings 
and behavioural measures (mean rBV–EO = .52; t TA-BV – BV-EO  (10) = 2.59, p < .027). The latter 
were not significantly higher than the correlations between trait-adjective ratings and 
behavioural measures (t TA-EO – BV-EO (10) = .96, p > .360).  
The construct Social orientation to group members showed an interesting pattern of 
cross-method coherence. The trait-adjective rating (“[Name] is friendly to group members”) 
showed a zero correlation to the corresponding behavioural construct measure composed of 
the social contact behaviours Groom, Embrace, and the prosocial facial displays Lip-smack 
and Scalp-lift (see Table 3). This is virtually identical to the results of a methodologically 
analogous study on keeper judgements of great ape individuals conducted in the German 
language (Uher & Asendorpf, 2008). In that study, the behaviour-descriptive verb ratings of 
Social orientation/Friendliness (to group members) were substantially correlated with the 
corresponding composite behavioural measures (r
  
= .68, p < .01), but both were 
uncorrelated with the corresponding trait-adjective ratings (r  = -.06 to .00, n.s.), suggesting 
that keepers may have based their judgements of “friendly” on low aggression instead of on 
social contact behaviours (Uher, 2011b). 
We therefore further explored the associations between the constructs Social 
orientation and Aggressiveness (both to group members) across methods. In fact, the trait-
adjective ratings of Social orientation (“friendly”) were negatively correlated with the 
Aggressiveness ratings in both formats (rTA(SO) – TA(AG) = -.54; p = .000 and rTA(SO) – BV(AG) = -.49; 
p = .000), but they were uncorrelated with the behavioural Aggressiveness measures (rTA(SO) 
– EO(AG) = -.21; p = .070). The behaviour-descriptive verb ratings of Social orientation, in turn, 
were uncorrelated with all three operationalisations of Aggressiveness (r
 BV(SO) – TA(AG)/ BV(AG)/ 
EO(AG) = .05 to .22; p = .060 to .614). But conversely, Aggressiveness ratings in both formats 
were positively associated with the behavioural Social orientation measures (rTA(AG) – EO(SO) = 
.37; p = .001; rBV(AG) – EO(SO) = .34; p = .003). This corresponds to the strong positive 
correlation that we found between the behavioural composite measures of both constructs 
(rEO(AG) – EO(SO) = .72; p = .000). 
 
3.3 Mediation analyses: How observers may have developed representations of the 
macaques’ personality differences 
We analysed potential developmental pathways of representations of personality. 
Specifically, we analysed whether the observers may have developed abstract 
representations of the macaques (as studied with trait-adjective ratings) rather directly from 
observations of a broad range of behavioural events (as studied with the behavioural 
composite construct measures), or whether their more specific representations that referred 
to only a few indicative behaviours (as studied with behaviour-descriptive verb ratings) may 
have served as mediators. Partial mediation would be evidenced when, controlling for 
behaviour-descriptive verb ratings, the behavioural composite construct measures still 
directly affected the trait-adjective ratings, and complete mediation when they no longer 
directly affected the trait-adjective ratings. 
We estimated and tested this model using multiple regression analyses according to 
Baron and Kenny (1986) for all 11 working constructs studied with all three methods. The 
behavioural composite construct measures as predictors were significantly correlated (p < 
.001) with both the trait-adjective ratings as criteria and the behaviour-descriptive verb 
ratings as potential mediators for eight constructs and for two further constructs when the 
significance levels were relaxed to p < .05. All constructs but Social orientation to group 
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members (see above) fulfilled these preconditions. For four working constructs, multiple 
regressions of trait-adjective ratings on behavioural composite construct measures and on 
behaviour-descriptive verb ratings (a) showed a significant impact of the mediator 
(behaviour-descriptive verb ratings) on the criterion (trait-adjective ratings), and (b) rendered 
the effect of the behavioural construct measures on the trait-adjective ratings non-significant. 
In these cases, the effects of behavioural construct measures on trait-adjective ratings were 
fully mediated by behaviour-descriptive verb ratings. For four additional constructs, the 
behavioural construct measures still directly affected the trait-adjective ratings when 
controlling for behaviour-descriptive verb ratings, thus fulfilling the criteria of partial mediation 
(Table 3). These findings mirror previous results on keeper judgements of great ape 
individuals (Uher & Asendorpf, 2008). 
 
3.4 Taxonomic structures  
3.4.1 Intercorrelations between behavioural composite construct measures 
Following the two-step reduction strategy of the BRxES-Approach (see Section 1.2), 
we studied structural patterns in the behavioural data at the level of working constructs. First, 
we analysed the internal consistency of the behavioural composite construct measures of 
Study year 1. In accordance with previous findings and theoretical considerations (see 
Section 1.1), it was moderate. For those eight construct measures that were composed of 
two to six behavioural measurements, the average internal consistency of the average 
measurements was ICC(3,k) = .627 (range .375 to .827) and of the single measurements it 
was ICC(3,1) = .368 (range .167 to .614). As one would expect, constructs composed of 
more k measurements tended to be more internally consistent, but this effect was not 
significant (r = .435, p = .282).  
We then computed intercorrelations between the behavioural composite construct 
measures within Study year 1 and Study year 2 in which the same macaque groups (R- and 
S-groups) were observed (see Section 2.6). The intercorrelational patterns between working 
constructs showed substantial agreement between these two Study years, thus indicating 
robust patterns. But there were also some differences. For example, the above-discussed 
high correlation between behavioural composite measures of Social orientation and 
Aggressiveness (both to group members; see Section 3.2) was lower in Study year 2, but 
still significant (r = .32). Behavioural composite measures of Arousability and Social 
orientation to group members were associated in Study year 1 (r = .48), but not in Study 
year 2. The same was true for the intercorrelations of the behavioural composite measures 
of Impulsiveness and Sexual activity, and of Social orientation to group members with both 
Impulsiveness and Sexual activity (see Table 4). 
 
3.4.2 Exploratory R-factor analyses of personality judgements 
We subjected the trait-adjective ratings and the behaviour-descriptive verb ratings on 
those 44 items that showed both interrater and test-retest reliability to exploratory R-factor 
analyses. To increase the reliability of the analysed ratings, we used the combined ratings of 
the two rater groups. We used the first ratings that we obtained for N = 104 macaque 
individuals; n = 97 of these ratings stemmed from Study year 1, n = 2 from Study year 2, and 
n = 5 from Study year 3. None of the macaques that were included from the last two Study 
years were rated again in any other Study year; their inclusion in the structural analysis 
therefore cannot interfere with analyses of stability between Study years (see Section 2.6).  
We applied principal axis factoring with oblique promax rotation, which aims for simple 
structures and allows for possible intercorrelations at the latent factor level. Based on 
principal axis factoring with squared multiple correlations as communality estimates, parallel 
analysis suggested the extraction of four rating factors; results based on principal 
components analysis were virtually identical. This solution agreed with the graphical elbow in 
the scree plot. Mean item communality was .70 (range .27 to .91); all but six communalities 
exceeded .50 (see Table 5). The eigenvalues of the four factors were 11.80, 10.96, 4.51, 
and 3.68, respectively, corresponding to 27%, 25%, 10%, and 8% in explained item 
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variance. All four rating factors together explained 70% of the item variance. The rating 
factors were moderately interrelated; the intercorrelations were rF1-F2 = .12; rF1-F3 = .38; rF1-F4 
= .01; rF2-F3 = .04; rF2-F4 = .23; and rF3-F4 = .27, corresponding to a maximum of 14% common 
variance.  
The meaning of the items with dominant loadings allowed for clear interpretations of 
the four rating factors (see Table 5). The first rating factor labelled Playful-active-curious 
mainly explained items operationalising the BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs 
Playfulness, Physical activity, Curiousness, Vigilance, Impulsiveness, and Arousability. The 
second rating factor labelled Aggressive-competitive mainly explained items operationalising 
Aggressiveness to group members, Competitiveness, Intervening in third-party conflicts, 
Sexual activity, Dominance, and (inverse) Social orientation to group members. The third 
rating factor labelled Prosocial-gregarious explained items operationalising Gregariousness, 
Social orientation to group members, and Social orientation to youngsters. The fourth rating 
factor labelled Assertive–nonanxious explained items operationalising Dominance and 
(inverse) Anxiousness.  
For 12 out of 18 working constructs, trait-adjective ratings and behaviour-descriptive 
verb ratings of the same working construct showed their highest loadings on the same rating 
factor, thus supporting the above-described evidence that observer judgements in that used 
different rating formats converged notably across rating formats for most constructs (see 
Section 3.2). For Anxiousness, Dominance, Impulsiveness, Social orientation to group 
members, and Social orientation to youngsters, items that were supposed to operationalise 
the same working construct loaded on different factors. Considering the item content, 
however, many of these split loadings are meaningful. For example, the trait-adjective item 
for Impulsiveness “[Name] is impulsive” loaded high (.82) on the Playful-active-curious rating 
factor. The corresponding behaviour-descriptive verb item “[Name] shakes trees, jumps on, 
or slaps others all of a sudden” did not load on this rating factor at all (.09), but loaded high 
(.74) on the Aggressive-competitive rating factor. The behaviour-descriptive verb item for 
Social orientation to youngsters that describes the care-taking related aspects of this 
construct (“[Name] takes care of youngsters by grooming and embracing them”), loaded 
moderately on the Prosocial-gregarious rating factor (.30). But it loaded negatively on the 
Playful-active-curious rating factor (-.26) on which the second behaviour-descriptive verb 
item for this construct describing the play-related aspects of this construct (“[Name] plays 
with youngsters”) loaded high (.81). Different kinds of Social orientation to youngsters also 
seem to be reflected by the corresponding trait-adjective rating item (“[Name] is friendly to 
youngsters”), which loaded (negatively) highest (-.42) on the Aggressive-competitive rating 
factor, but almost equally high (.41) on the Playful-active-curious rating factor. 
Operationalisations of the working construct Dominance seemed to be split, however. 
The trait-adjective item loaded high (.76) on the Aggressive-competitive rating factor, 
whereas both behaviour-descriptive verb items loaded high (-.70 and .61) on the Assertive–
nonanxious rating factor. The only moderate correlation between these factors (r = .23) 
suggests that these items may refer to representations of different kinds of dominance (e.g., 
of dominance as social status versus as assertiveness). The trait-adjective operationalising 
Social orientation to group members loaded (negatively) moderate to high (-.50) on the 
Aggressive-competitive rating factor, whereas the two pertinent behaviour-descriptive verb 
items loaded high (.78 and .88) on the Prosocial-gregarious rating factor. This reflects the 
above-analysed patterns of association between the constructs Aggressiveness and Social 
Orientation to group members. The behaviour-descriptive item describing self-sexual activity 
as part of the working construct Sexual activity showed multiple low loadings on all rating 
factors (Table 5).  
For subsequent analyses, we estimated factor scores on the four rating factors for all 
104 individuals using Thurstone’s (1935) exact regression method (Grice, 2001a, 2001b). 
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3.4.3 Associations between behavioural composite construct measures and rating 
factor scores and between their structures 
First, we analysed the relations of the behavioural composite measures of the BRxES-
Approach-generated working constructs to the four rating factor scores. These associations, 
analysed with Pearson correlations (r), paralleled the factor-analytic loading patterns of the 
respective rating items in most cases. Playful-active-curious rating factor scores were most 
strongly associated with the behavioural measures of Playfulness (r = .81) and 
Impulsiveness (r = .45), and Aggressive-competitive rating factor scores with the behavioural 
measures of Aggressiveness (r = .63) and Sexual activity (r = .51). Prosocial-gregarious 
rating factor scores were most closely related to the behavioural measures of 
Gregariousness (r = .57) and Playfulness (r = .49), and Assertive-nonanxious rating factor 
scores with the behavioural measures of Dominance (r = .63) and (inverse) Anxiousness (r = 
-.51; Table 6).  
We then compared the associations between working constructs that we found in the 
behavioural composite construct measures (3.4.1.) with those reflected in the four-factorial 
rating structure (3.4.2). The structures of these different data sets generally showed 
considerable coherence (see highlighted cells in Table 6). But we also found some additional 
associations in the behavioural measures that were not reflected in the ratings. For example, 
we found correlations between the behavioural composite measures of Playfulness and 
Anxiousness (r = .43 and .55), Arousability and Sexual activity (r = .38 and .52), Curiousness 
and Sexual activity (r = .45 and .55), Gregariousness and Anxiousness (r = -.25 and -.40), 
Gregariousness and Dominance (r = .36 and .52), in addition to those of Social orientation 
and Aggressiveness (each to group members) described above. 
Conversely, some associations reflected in the rating factor structure (see Table 4) 
were not found in the behavioural composite construct measures. For example, ratings of 
Arousability loaded negatively (-.40) on the Assertive–nonanxious rating factor; but the 
behavioural composite measures of Arousability was uncorrelated with those of either 
Dominance or Anxiousness. Ratings of (allo-)Sexual activity (.75 and .76) and Dominance 
(.76) loaded high on the Aggressive-competitive rating factor, but the corresponding 
behavioural composite measures were not associated with one another. Ratings of 
Aggressiveness (.88) and Anxiousness (-.76) loaded high on this rating factor as well, but 
the behavioural composite measures of these constructs were uncorrelated.  
 
3.4.4 Associations of the macaques’ demographic factors with their individual-
specific behaviours and how these were represented by the observers  
We studied three demographic factors: age, sex, and social rank. The age and sex of 
all macaques were known from the colony studbooks. Information on social rank was taken 
from consensual lists of the macaques’ linear rank positions that the station’s scientific staff 
maintained and regularly updated based on their observations in research and daily 
management. These lists were derived from assessments that corresponded to linear Q-
sorts of the rank-order of all macaques within each group on dominance. Note that these Q-
sorts of social rank were established independently from the dominance ratings obtained 
from the respective trait-adjective and behaviour-descriptive verb items. These latter 
measures were provided separately for each macaque using frequency ratings, whereas the 
Q-sorts were derived from direct comparisons between the macaques. For comparisons 
across all three groups, which differed in size (see Section 2.1), we first z-standardised the 
social rank data within each group and then pooled the z-standardised scores from all three 
macaque groups to compute a social rank index. To control for the asymmetry in the sex 
ratio of the sample, which generally comprised more females than males but slightly more 
males than females in the younger age groups (see Section 2.1), we used multiple 
regression analyses to explore the relations of the macaques’ age, sex, and social rank. We 
studied the associations of these demographic factors at the level of working constructs 
using the individuals’ scores on the behavioural composite construct measures, the 
behaviour-descriptive verb ratings, and the trait-adjective ratings of Study year 1 (cf. 3.1.3).  
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We found substantial cross-method coherences in these associations for many 
constructs, but also interesting divergences for some constructs. On the one hand, we found 
associations reflected in the judgements that were not found in the behavioural composite 
construct measures. For example, in the observers’ judgements in both item formats, young 
age was strongly associated with high Curiousness (β = .57-.64; standardised β coefficients 
are provided) and high social rank was associated with high Impulsiveness (β = .38-.74) and 
high Sexual activity (β = .42-.43); but such associations were not found for the behavioural 
measures. Similarly, for the trait-adjective judgements, young age was substantially 
associated with high Arousability and high Impulsiveness (β = .56 and β = .52) and high 
social rank was associated with high Cleanliness (β = .26). For the behaviour-descriptive 
verb judgements, male sex was associated with low Cleanliness (β = -.34) and high Sexual 
activity (β = .29). But in all these cases, such associations were not found for the behavioural 
measures (see Table 7).  Conversely, the behavioural measures yielded associations that 
were not reflected by the observers’ judgements. For example, young age was associated 
with high Anxiousness (β = -.32), and male sex with both high Anxiousness (β = .21) and 
high Impulsiveness (β = .30). But these associations were not reflected by either rating 
format.  
For some constructs, the patterns of cross-method coherence diverged between item 
formats. For example, for the behavioural measures, high social rank and high Arousability 
were positively associated (β = .25). This was also reflected by the trait-adjective ratings and 
was even more pronounced (β = .45); but for the pertinent behaviour-descriptive verb 
ratings, this association was negative (β = -.34). By contrast, the finding that high social rank 
and high Social orientation to group members were positively associated in the behavioural 
measures (β = .36) was also reflected by the behaviour-descriptive verb ratings (β = .38), but 
not by the pertinent trait-adjective ratings (n.s.). For the behavioural measures, male sex and 
high Social orientation to group members were negatively associated (β = -.24). But this was 
not reflected by the behaviour-descriptive verb ratings (n.s.), and the pertinent trait-adjective 
ratings even reflected a positive association (β = .39; see Table 7 for all standardised β 
coefficients and p values).  
 
3.5 Stability across 12 and 24 months  
3.5.1 Stability of behavioural composite construct measures  
All behavioural composite measures of the BRxES-Approach-generated working 
constructs showed significant stabilities across at least one of the two 12-month intervals 
(mean r = .54 and .57 for the first and second 12-month intervals, respectively; ranging from 
r = -.04 to .86). Playfulness was highly stable from Study year 1 to Study year 2 (r = .86), but 
unstable from both Study year 1 and Study year 2 to Study year 3 (both rs = -.04). This 
dramatic decline may be due to the fact that breeding was stopped in those years; therefore, 
fewer youngsters were available as potential play partners for the individuals studied in 
Study year 3. But all other behavioural composite construct measures were notably stable 
even across 24 months (mean r = .61; range r = -.04 to .85; see Table 8). 
  
3.5.2 Stability of rating factor scores  
To study stability across Study years, we computed factor score weights based on the 
first ratings that we obtained for N = 104 individuals (see Section 3.4.1). Using these factor 
score weights, we estimated factor scores for all subsequent Study years in which rating 
data for the respective macaques were available (see Section 2.6). This may constitute a 
conservative estimate of stability at the latent factor level because the rating factor score 
weights are optimal estimates only for Study year 1 and are influenced by sampling error. 
We computed longitudinal Pearson correlations (r) of these score estimates for each rating 
factor. Note that these analyses were based on different sample sizes in each Study year 
(see Section 2.6). 
The average 12-month stability of the rating factor scores was r = .77 and r = .60 for 
the first and second 12-month intervals, respectively. The average 24-month stability was r = 
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.54. All stabilities were greater than r = .40. Stabilities across 12 months were generally the 
highest from Study year 1 to Study year 2. This may be due to changes in sample size 
(Study years 1→2, n = 59; Study years 2→3, n = 30; Study years 1→3, n = 53) and in group 
composition in Study year 3, a change that may also have affected the 24-months stabilities. 
The most stable scores across all longitudinal intervals studied were found for the Playful-
active-curious rating factor; the second most stable were those on the Aggressive-
competitive factor. In addition to the stability of the latent structures underlying these 
judgements, this may have resulted from the fact that more items had high loadings on these 
two rating factors than on the two others, thus rendering the score estimates more reliable. 
The scores on the rating factors of Prosocial-gregarious and of Assertive–nonanxious 
showed similar stabilities (see Table 8). 
 
4. Discussion 
This study explored the human socio-cognitive abilities to recognise and to represent 
individual-specificity even in some nonhuman species—abilities that have been essential 
prerequisites for important developments in recent human evolution, such as for animal 
domestication (Uher, 2013; cf. Belyaev, 1969; Diamond, 2002; Trut, 1999). We successfully 
applied a novel philosophy-of-science paradigm for personality psychology to systematically 
study and compare individual-specific behaviours of crab-eating macaques and the 
representations that human observers with different levels of experience developed of them. 
The selection of members of a nonhuman species as those individuals whose individual-
specificity is in the focus allowed us to demonstrate essential differences between these 
different phenomena, to explore the developmental pathways of these representations, and 
to highlight important implications for methodology and research methods. 
 
4.1 Rapid formation of personality impressions of macaque individuals  
In their personality judgements of the macaque individuals, the novices agreed with 
one another and with the experts equally well as did the experts with one another—in all six 
Study waves comprising 91 novices. This robust finding is remarkable given that the novices 
had just five observation days, whereas the experts had already known these macaques for 
at least several months. The use of ethological methods and of a comprehensive ethogram 
may have systematically directed the novices’ attention to important behaviours of this 
species, thereby facilitating their acquisition of pertinent knowledge. This finding is also 
remarkable given that each novice pair focused on just five target macaques. We had 
expected that knowledge of just a handful of individuals of a previously unfamiliar species 
would be insufficient to recognise individual-specificity—given that this presupposes 
knowledge of how individuals of this species generally differ from one another (see Section 
1.). At least we had expected agreement between novices to be significantly lower than that 
between experts who knew all macaques of their study groups. This was not the case. 
Perhaps, the incidental observation of many “anonymous others” in the target macaques’ 
groups (consisting of 24-42 members) also helped the novices to acquire pertinent 
knowledge to sufficient degrees.  
Despite this, the temporal reliability of judgements provided by the same persons (i.e., 
experts) was significantly higher than judgements provided by different persons (i.e., 
between experts and novices and between novices). One explanation may lie in the experts’ 
much greater observational experiences that covered both Study waves compared (and 
further periods), whereas those of the novices covered just one. Partial overlap in 
observation periods can also explain why temporal cross-correlations between expert ratings 
and novice ratings tended to be significantly higher than the temporal correlations between 
novice ratings, which covered non-overlapping time periods. (The combined ratings of the 
two rater groups capitalised on the experts’ experiences from both Study waves and on 
aggregation across more raters.)  
These findings demonstrate the novices’ ability to rapidly develop representations of 
individual-specific behaviours of crab-eating macaques that were shared with experts on this 
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species. This supports assumptions and previous indirect (see Section 1.) and direct 
evidence (e.g., Capitanio, 1999; Pederson, King, & Landau, 2005; Uher, 2011b) that 
humans are able to apply their sophisticated socio-cognitive abilities to recognise and to 
mentally represent individual-specific behaviours in socially shared ways to some nonhuman 
species as well.   
However, agreement between persons in and of itself cannot reveal the mental and 
social processes that are involved in the recognition and construction of individual-specificity 
nor does it imply the accuracy of these representations in terms of their coherence to the 
phenomena that are being represented. Present-day humans are born into a world full of 
complex social knowledge and pertinent semiotic systems. The personal and social 
representations of human individuals therefore develop in tight dialectical interplays with one 
another, with the pertinent lexical encodings (cf. Lahlou, 1996, 2001, 2008), and with the 
individual-specific behaviours (and outer appearances) to which they refer as shown by the 
pervasive influences that socio-cultural norms and values have on them. These different 
phenomena cannot be explored and understood independently from one another (Uher, 
2013)—at least in studies focussing solely on humans. The present research on a 
nonhuman primate species that is related to humans yet not endemic to our observers’ 
region of origin opened up interesting opportunities to illuminate these human abilities 
because these persons could not have relied on complex everyday knowledge of individuals 
of this particular species.  
 
4.2 Through human personality glasses: How the observers may have developed their 
representations of the macaques’ personality differences 
The observers’ agreement in their judgements of the macaque individuals is a 
reflection of their shared socio-cognitive abilities and their necessarily anthropocentric 
perspective on them. Systematic contrasts to the macaques’ behaviours therefore 
highlighted factors that are important for the recognition, construction, and social 
representation of individual-specificity.  
 
4.2.1 Salience 
One important factor is salience for humans. For example, the constructs 
Anxiousness, Aggressiveness, Impulsiveness, and Dominance describe behaviours that 
involve noise, rapid movements (e.g., Scream, Chase, Bite, Tree shake), or striking facial 
expressions (e.g., Bared teeth) that immediately capture attention. Humans may recognise 
and represent individual differences in such behaviours more quickly and perhaps even in 
more pronounced ways than individual differences in behaviours with lower salience. In fact, 
the trait-adjective ratings of these constructs were amongst the most reliable ones, whereas 
the corresponding behavioural measures were actually the least or not even temporally 
reliable. Moreover, these are behaviours of brief occurrence (i.e., frequency or point 
behaviours) that can be missed out more easily than duration behaviours—in particular in 
observations of (compared to humans) small and agile individuals in groups of 24 to 42. 
Conversely, individual differences in arousal behaviours such as Yawn and Scratch, both 
frequency behaviours of lower salience for humans, were substantially reliable over time, but 
the corresponding judgements referring to exactly these behaviours showed neither 
interrater nor test-retest reliability. Individual differences in Self-groom, a non-salient duration 
behaviour, were also substantially reliable across time, but the observers’ pertinent 
representations were not. These deviations are insightful because the observers (at least the 
novices) must have consciously perceived the single events—of both salient and non-salient 
behaviours—that are summarised in the behavioural measures when recording those of their 
target macaques during observations. 
 
4.2.2 Possible pathways of mental abstraction  
A further factor contributing to agreement between observers are their shared human 
abilities to abstract from perceived behavioural events and to mentally reconstrue individual-
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specificity (see Section 1.). Our results on mediation effects suggest (at least for some 
constructs) that more specific representations of individual-specificity in certain behaviours 
may have served as intermediate steps in the development of more abstract representations 
that are frequently encoded with trait-adjectives. For example, observations of events of 
various aggressive behaviours (e.g., Threat, Chase, Bite) may have been abstracted bottom-
up into representations of individual-specificity in specific aggressive behaviours that in turn 
may have facilitated the development of abstract representations of individuals as differing in 
degrees of “being aggressive”. These results mirror previous ones obtained on keeper 
judgements of great ape individuals (Uher & Asendorpf, 2008). They also match 
developmental models of impression formation suggesting that, at low levels of experience 
with a target person, impressions are represented as behavioural exemplars and that from 
these, with increasing experience, abstract impressions are extracted that can then be 
retrieved independently for judgement purposes (Park, 1986; Sherman & Klein, 1994).  
 
4.2.3 Socially shared knowledge of human personality differences 
To develop representations of personality, however, present-day humans need not 
individually make complex abstractions from their own experiences. They can also acquire 
this knowledge from others—through social exchange and from pertinent lexical encodings 
(cf. Lahlou, 2001). The study of nonhuman individuals provides interesting insights into these 
alternative pathways of developing representations of personality because there is no 
reason to assume that humans have developed equally comprehensive systems of 
knowledge and of pertinent lexical encodings about individuals of other species (Uher, 
2011b; except for comparably small lexical repertoires within specific communities, such as 
those about dogs used in cynology). Hence, to make up for the lack of pertinent knowledge 
of the nonhuman individuals under study, our observers could have developed knowledge of 
them based on their comprehensive everyday knowledge of human individuals. Social 
representations and their everyday language terms are important tools of thought and social 
communication (Neuman, Turney, & Cohen, 2012; Peirce, 1902, CP 4.227; Vygotsky, 1962) 
that may influence how people perceive, interpret, and appraise individuals and their 
behaviours. The observers’ constructs of human personality—their human personality 
glasses—could therefore have guided and shaped top-down their perceptions of the 
macaques and their reconstructions and representations of these individuals’ personality 
differences from the very start.  
We found interesting pieces of evidence supporting this assumption with regard to 
some behaviours. For example, the observers’ behaviour-descriptive representations of 
Social orientation were moderately related to the macaques’ individual-specific prosocial 
behaviours, but their pertinent abstract trait-adjectival representations were completely 
unrelated to these behaviours. Analyses of associations with Aggressiveness illuminated this 
puzzling finding. In the behavioural data, we found that macaques showing more prosocial 
behaviours also showed more aggressive behaviours than others. But the observers 
represented individual differences in these behaviours on behaviour-descriptive levels as 
unrelated and on abstract trait-adjectival levels as even negatively associated. However, 
they must have at least implicitly noticed the positive associations reflected in the 
behavioural data because their Aggressiveness ratings were positively associated with the 
macaques’ prosocial behaviours. But conversely, their Social orientation ratings were 
completely unrelated to the macaques’ aggressive behaviours. These asymmetric 
relationships indicate that the formation of these representations may have been influenced 
by socio-culturally shared appraisals of behaviour.  
 
4.2.4 Socio-culturally shared interpretations and appraisals of behaviour 
The abstract bipolar representation of Social orientation and Aggressiveness follows 
the logic of the opposite valence of the trait-adjectives “friendly” and “aggressive” (at least for 
the observers’ socio-cultural communities) but not the structural patterns of the macaques’ 
corresponding behaviours. The implicit meaning of the term “friendly” and the positive 
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valence attributed to prosocial behaviours obviously precluded the idea that the more 
“friendly” macaques could also be the more “aggressive” ones. This led to representations 
that not only failed to reflect the associations found in behaviour, but also to some that 
reflected even inverse associations. These inaccurate representations could also be an 
effect of social desirability that people attribute to prosocial behaviours in general and in 
particular to their interpretation as “friendly” in terms of halo-effects.  
These findings also support assumptions that implicit meanings and valences that 
particular behaviours have for (particular) human observers may interfere top-down with their 
perceptions and (re)constructions of individual-specificity, thus introducing biases. This top-
down interference may also account for the low and highly inconsistent cross-method 
coherence that we found for the construct Social orientation. By contrast, the high and 
consistent cross-method coherence of the construct Aggressiveness supports assumptions 
that the pertinent representations could have been developed from systematic bottom-up 
abstractions of perceived behavioural events. These findings demonstrate the importance of 
generating unipolar constructs that describe functionally homogeneous sets of behaviours as 
conceived in the BRxES-Approach (see Section 2.3). 
 
4.2.5 Socio-culturally shared assumptions about associations with demographic 
factors  
Socio-culturally shared interpretations, appraisals, and explanations of observable 
individual behaviour may be particularly pronounced with regard to demographic factors 
because these are rather directly apparent. The relations between demographic factors and 
individual-specific behaviours that can be found in nonhuman species may differ from those 
found in human communities because of differences in their social and behavioural systems. 
Observer representations that fail to accurately reflect these associations of other species 
may be due to low salience for human observers—not just of behaviours, but sometimes 
also of the age, sex, and social rank of nonhuman individuals. But inaccurate 
representations may also derive from attribution biases—in particular if they reflect 
pronounced associations not found in the target species. Because “there is a universal 
tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves” (Hume, 1757/1957, p. xix), 
such deviations are insightful about the pertinent socio-culturally shared stereotypes of the 
particular human observers.  
Our observers, who all knew at least the sex and age of their target macaques, 
represented young macaques as being more excitable, more curious, and more impulsive 
than older ones, males as being less apt to clean and groom themselves and more sexually 
active than females, and high-ranking macaques as being more impulsive and more sexually 
active than low-ranking ones. But we found no age, sex, and rank differences in the 
described behaviours at all. The observers also represented males as being more socially 
oriented to their conspecifics than females when in fact they were even less so. Conversely, 
in the behavioural measures, we found that young macaques were more anxious than older 
ones and males were more anxious than females—but the observers did not represent these 
(or any other) age and sex differences in these salient behaviours. These biases most likely 
reflect influences of their socio-culturally shared age- and gender-related stereotypes about 
human individuals—and thus, these are anthropomorphic attributions. These findings 
provide empirical evidence for previously voiced concerns that relations with demographic 
factors of nonhuman species found in judgement-based studies (e.g., King, Weiss, & Sisco, 
2008) are prone to anthropomorphic biases and may reveal little about the nonhuman 
individuals under study (Uher et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, the observers did not represent the higher impulsiveness of males. Given 
that impulsive behaviours are salient (see above) and that this finding conforms to socio-
cultural gender stereotypes about human males, it may well be possible that the observers 
did notice and represent the males’ higher impulsiveness. They may even have considered 
this implicitly in their judgements—by comparing males not with all of the macaques in the 
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sample, but with only other males instead. Thus, they may have adjusted their judgements to 
a more specific reference population, thereby zeroing out sex differences in the rating data.  
This problem and further ones are inherent to judgement-based methods. Their 
systematic investigation and the development of possible solutions and alternative methods 
is hindered by the wide-spread but erroneous assumption that questionnaire data could 
directly reflect individual-specific behaviours—and even the psychological processes 
underlying them (Gillespie & Zittaun, 2010; Lamiell, 2003; Michell, 1997; Omi, 2012; 
Schwarz, 1999; Toomela, 2011; Trendler, 2009; Uher, 2013; Valsiner, 2012; Westen, 1996).  
 
4.3 The new philosophy-of-science paradigm for personality psychology 
The new philosophy-of-science paradigm emphasises meta-theoretical differentiations 
of people’s (lexically encoded) representations and of different phenomena that are being 
represented as personality. Together with analyses of the theoretical natures of these 
different phenomena, this opened up new possibilities to explore the socio-cognitive abilities 
that are involved in these representations. This also sheds new light on the questionnaire-
based methods and the lexical approaches that are predominantly used for their 
investigation. 
 
4.3.1 Limitations of questionnaire methods  
It is well known that people can flexibly adjust their personality judgements to particular 
circumstances, such as to specific reference groups (Heine et al., 2002), to different socio-
cultural norms that are implicitly associated with the same questionnaire items in different 
languages (e.g., of the NEO-FFI, Veltkamp et al., 2012), or to experimentally induced goals 
and motivations (Biesanz & Human, 2010). But these findings reveal neither which particular 
elements of the sets of behaviours, outer appearances, situations, time, and individuals (B, 
O, S, T, and I) people actually consider when they subjectively quantify individual-specificity, 
nor how they demarcate quantifiable entities in these phenomena and how they convert 
them into data. It also remains unknown which particular elements of the sets of 
interpretations, appraisals, and explanations may frame their implicit considerations in a 
particular judgement (see Section 1.; Uher, 2013).  
Fixing the contents to be judged does not solve the problem because the same 
standardised items of personality inventories are associated with different fields of 
meaning—both within and even more between persons—as this has already been shown for 
facets of the Five Factor Model and for items of the pertinent inventories (Arro, 2013; 
Diriwächter et al., 2005; Rosenbaum & Valsiner, 2011). This offers a further explanation for 
our finding that judgements provided by the same persons had significantly higher test-retest 
reliability than judgements provided by different persons: The associated fields of meaning of 
two persons are likely less diverse than those of four persons. Thus, the temporal reliability 
of judgements on fixed scales provided by the same persons may also be in part a 
methodological artefact rather than solely a reflection of the stability of people’s actual 
representations of personality.  
It also follows that the particular fields of meaning that the persons under study have in 
mind when providing personality judgements need not be identical to those that the 
researchers consider in their analyses (Arro, 2013; Rosenbaum & Valsiner, 2011). Here we 
have focused on behaviours, but it may well be possible that our observers also considered 
the macaques’ outer appearances, such that some had more robust or more gracile bones 
and limbs or physiognomic peculiarities. The observers may have associated particular 
individual-specific outer appearances and behaviours with one another, such as assuming 
that physically more robust macaques may also be the more assertive ones. We do not 
know about this. Neither do we know how the observers actually interpreted the macaques’ 
behaviours (and outer appearances), what explanations they may have developed for these, 
which inferences they may have drawn about possible causal events in both the macaques’ 
psyche and the environmental situations that they encountered, and what appraisals the 
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observers may have made for all of this. We can only speculate about this because the fixed 
contents of personality inventories precluded the collection of any further information.  
Alternative methods that are designed to match the theoretical nature and the 
complexity of the phenomena under study are therefore required (Omi, 2012; Toomela, 
2009, 2011; Weber, 1949; Westen, 1996). Specifically, to explore personal and social 
representations, we need methods that allow the persons under study to explicate what 
entities they conceive and how they interpret, appraise, and explain the phenomena that 
they represent in these entities as is enabled by open answer formats (Kelly, 1955; for an 
empirical example see e.g., Park, 1986). To explore what people actually perceive, what 
they consider salient and why, and how they abstract from perceived events and develop 
representations of an individual’s personality we also need methods that allow for 
investigations of psychological processes, rather than just of their outcomes (Gillespie & 
Zittaun, 2010; Jovchelovitch, 2007; Komatsu, 2012; Pillai, 2012; Westen, 1996). Because 
psychological phenomena are bound to the present (see Section 1.), this requires 
investigations that are as temporally close as possible to these processes as can be done, 
for example, with microgenetic methods (e.g., Wagoner, 2009; Valsiner, 1998, 2012). Such 
methods are also needed to explore what fields of meaning particular persons construct for 
particular standardised items in personality inventories, how they do this, and how they 
subjectively synthesise these fields to provide a numerical estimate as this has already been 
demonstrated for NEO-PI items (Rosenbaum & Valsiner, 2011; cf. also Michell, 2000, 2003; 
Schwarz, 1999; Wagoner & Valsiner, 2005).  
The restricted answer formats of personality inventories produce comparably well-
structured data. The internal consistencies of the four rating factors (as indicated by the 
factor loadings) were much higher than those of the behavioural composite measures of 
BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs. This was true although the rating factors 
referred to a much greater diversity of behaviours than the working constructs, which 
summarised only functionally related behaviours. The taxonomic structures of the rating data 
were clearer and simpler than those of the behavioural data that yielded many further 
associations between working constructs not reflected in the observer judgements. This 
higher structuredness of rating data is not astonishing. It essentially reflects the patterns of 
logic that our human minds follow—both in how people perceive, (re)construct, represent, 
and judge individuals and in how researchers develop personality inventories by selecting 
only those rating items of meaningfully related content that yield empirically consistent data 
structures (Uher, 2013).  
 
4.3.2 Non-lexical construct generation: The Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental 
Situations Approach 
The present analyses on coherence of the observers’ representations with the 
macaques’ observable individual behaviours and on attribution biases were enabled by a 
new taxonomic approach, the BRxES-Approach. Its non-lexical selection rationale allows 
researchers to systematically generate constructs of individual-specificity for comprehensive 
taxonomic investigations both of individual-specific behaviours and of people’s pertinent 
representations. Importantly, it allows for generating constructs of individual-specific 
behaviours independent of the pertinent representations that particular socio-cultural and 
language communities or particular researchers have developed. This is not possible for 
lexical approaches because their rationale is based on the selection of lexical encodings of 
social representations that particular language communities have developed (cf. Goldberg, 
1981; John et al., 1988). Lexical approaches therefore cannot disentangle the phenomena 
that are being represented from their socio-cultural interpretation, appraisal, and explanation.  
The BR×ES-Approach starts taxonomic research from behavioural repertoires rather 
than from lexical repertoires to generate constructs of individual-specificity, and defines 
these constructs based on the behaviours’ scientifically established functional 
relatedness rather than on lay people’s (or researchers’) pertinent representations reflecting 
possible interrelations and socio-culturally shared valences of behaviours. This opens up 
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unprecedented opportunities to systematically explore how individual-specific behaviours 
actually vary within and between particular (human and nonhuman) populations. Further 
taxonomic approaches are needed for investigations of individual-specific outer appearances 
to study how these are associated with the behavioural structures in particular populations 
and to explore how these phenomena and their (possible) associations are represented and 
lexically encoded by particular human communities. This also allows for systematic analyses 
of the ways in which people’s representations and judgements of personality reflect biases 
that are derived from their socio-cultural stereotypes about relations between individuals’ 
behaviours, appearances, and demographic status, such as ethnic group, age, gender/sex, 
or social position (Uher et al., 2013). Once established, such comprehensive taxonomic 
models can also guide research on causally related phenomena internal and external to the 
individual, and on the complex relations among all these different kinds of phenomena. Such 
guidance is important because internal phenomena are not directly perceivable and the 
enormous diversity of external phenomena complicates the identification of those that are 
causally related (for details, see Uher, 2013)  
 
4.4 Summary and future directions 
This research successfully demonstrated the application of a new philosophy-of-
science paradigm for personality psychology that explicitly differentiates people’s 
representations and their lexical encodings from the phenomena that are being represented 
and encoded—individual-specific behaviours and outer appearances, causally related 
phenomena internal (especially psychological) and external (environmental) to the individual, 
and (socio-culturally shared) interpretations, appraisals, and explanations of these 
phenomena.  
Here we provided strong empirical evidence that crab-eating macaques exhibit a broad 
range of individual-specific behaviours that are notably stable across 12 and 24 months; 
these findings provide a solid basis for future explorations of their internal and external 
causes and consequences. We showed that limited observational experiences were 
sufficient for novices to quickly develop personality impressions of macaque individuals 
comparable to those of experts who had already known these macaques for some time. We 
discussed possible pathways in the formation of these representations and highlighted the 
likely impact of the observers’ socially shared knowledge of human personality, which 
present-day humans acquire together with their native language. This knowledge is also 
reflected in the notable 12- and 24-month stabilities of the representations that different 
experts and different novices had developed in the three Study years. The systematic 
coherence between the macaques’ individual-specific behaviours and the observers’ 
pertinent representations found for several constructs argue that this knowledge of human 
personality is viable to some extent to allow people to develop accurate representations also 
of nonhuman individuals—at least of some species that are phylogenetically related, yet not 
necessarily endemic. But we also found profound attribution biases in the observers’ 
personality judgements of these nonhuman individuals that likely reflect their socio-culturally 
shared stereotypes about age, sex/gender, and social position of human individuals. 
Our results extend previous evidence that the Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental 
Situations Approach (Uher, 2008a, 2008b, 2011a, 2011b) constitutes a viable non-lexical 
approach for comprehensive taxonomic investigations of individual-specific behaviours 
independent of the pertinent representations that people (both lay people and researchers) 
have developed of them. Moreover, it also allows for systematic taxonomic investigations of 
these representations. Thus, the two kinds of phenomena can be investigated using the 
same methodological approach. Together with further taxonomic approaches for 
investigations of individual-specific outer appearances, and with systematic explorations of 
causally related phenomena, this opens up unprecedented possibilities to explore how 
persons from different socio-cultural and language communities perceive individuals, what 
they consider salient, and how they construct and represent individual-specificity and why. It 
will therefore be insightful to study various species that differ in phylogenetic relatedness and 
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similarity to humans. But it will ultimately be most insightful to study the diversity within 
humankind (Uher, 2013).  
The new philosophy-of-science paradigm also highlighted important methodological 
and methodical implications. In this study, we used judgements made on predetermined 
assessment scales with restricted answer formats and we analysed the thus-obtained rating 
data following established standards of contemporary personality psychology—knowing that 
the phenomena that such data reflect cannot have the metric properties that are frequently 
attributed to them and that are required for such statistics. We are fully aware that the 
analyses presented may not adequately reflect the representations that our observers had 
actually developed of the macaque individuals—as this is true for any questionnaire-based 
study. Yet it was our aim to express critical concerns about these methods by demonstrating 
by their very application essential divergences from behavioural data and important 
limitations in their abilities to capture representations, to unravel their possible development, 
and to reveal how people actually generate quantitative personality judgements in a given 
moment. This would not have been possible had we used other methods because any 
divergences and limitations could then be attributed to these other methods.  
It is certainly worthwhile to study larger samples of both crab-eating macaques and of 
human observers, as is true for any research. But it is far more important to study and to 
better understand the processes that underlie the remarkable human abilities to quickly 
recognise and to mentally and socially represent individual-specificity in behaviour (and 
outer appearances) in individual members of our own species and of some others. A better 
knowledge of these abilities—enabled by a new paradigm offering a comprehensive 
philosophy of science and new methodologies for personality psychology and by the 
systematic further development of alternative non-questionnaire-based methods—will 
advance our understanding of some of the most important socio-cognitive developments in 
the recent evolution of our species and of the ways in which we are in fact unique. 
*** 
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Glossary of terms from the new philosophy-of-science paradigm for personality 
psychology relevant to the present analyses  
 
Behavioural composite construct measures:  Composite variables reflecting differential 
scores of individual behavioural probabilities on the level of the BRxES-Approach-
generated working constructs. They were derived from aggregating all those 
behavioural measurements that were assigned to a particular construct based on 
the scientifically established functional relatedness of the behaviours. Composite 
measures for which temporal reliability between the two Study waves of a given 
Study year can be evidenced reflect summary scores of individual-specific patterns 
of behaviour. 
Behavioural measurements:  Measurement variables reflecting differential scores of 
individual probabilities to display specific behaviours in the social situations that we 
observed in the macaque groups. They were derived from aggregating the raw 
measurements across all five observation days within each Study wave to obtain 
time-relative probabilities for each individual. These aggregate scores were then z-
standardised across all individuals within each Study wave to obtain scores 
reflecting differential scores in these behavioural probabilities. Temporal reliability 
between Study waves within a given Study year provides evidence that the 
behavioural measurements reflect individual-specific patterns of behaviour. 
Individual-specific patterns of behaviour:  Because behaviours are highly fluctuating, 
individuals can be characterised only in behavioural probabilities that differ between 
individuals in relatively stable ways. To reflect individual-specificity, differential 
patterns of behavioural probabilities must be stable across time periods longer than 
those in which the probabilities were first ascertained and in ways considered to be 
meaningful (e.g., defined via test-retest correlation scores between Study waves). 
Accordingly, behavioural measurements reflecting individual-specificity were 
derived from 1) aggregation over repeated measurement occasions; 2) 
standardisation of these aggregate scores; and 3) evidence of temporal reliability in 
the standardised aggregate scores. 
Mean rating scores:  The raw rating scores were aggregated on different levels: 1) on the 
level of each Study wave, scores were averaged across raters separately for the 
different rater groups (i.e., mean expert ratings, mean novice ratings) and from 
these we computed mean scores of both rater groups; 2) on the level of each Study 
year, the mean scores of both rater groups were aggregated across Study waves; 
3) the mean scores per Study year of the behaviour-descriptive verb items were 
aggregated on the level of the BRxES-Approach generated working constructs.  
Non-lexical emic personality constructs:  Constructs of individual-specificity (called 
working constructs) that are not derived from within the human repertoires of 
everyday language terms as in lexical research, but from within the scientifically 
described behavioural-ecological system of the population under study using the 
Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations-Approach (BRxES-Approach; 
see Section 2.3). We used BRxES-Approach-generated constructs to study the 
individual-specific behaviours that they describe for the macaques under study; for 
this purpose, we operationalised them with behavioural measurements. We also 
used these constructs to study the representations that human observers 
developed of the macaques’ individual-specific behaviours. Each construct was 
therefore operationalised in rating items (i.e., in sentences with trait-adjectives, TA, 
and behaviour-descriptive verbs, BV) that describe their contents in the everyday 
language of the raters (experts and novices) under study. 
Rating factor scores:  Scores for each macaque individual for each Study year on each of 
the four rating factors. These rating factors were statistically derived from 
exploratory R-factor analyses on all single rating items (i.e., trait-adjective items and 
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behaviour-descriptive verb items) using the mean combined scores of both rater 
groups. 
Raw rating scores:  The rating scores that the single raters provided for each macaque 
individual on each rating item on a 5-point frequency scale. 
Working constructs:  Constructs generated with the BRxES-Approach (see Non-lexical 
emic personality constructs) based on the hypothetical assumption that individual-
specific patterns can be found in behaviours of particular categories displayed in 
situations of particular categories. This hypothetical assumption must be empirically 
substantiated for each construct; otherwise the particular working construct has to 
be discarded. The individual-specific behaviours described in the working 
constructs and the pertinent representations that human observers develop of them 
can be further explored for their underlying structures and stabilities. 
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macaques (Macaca fascicularis) 
 
Aldrich-Blake, F. P. G. (1980). Long-tailed macaques. In D. J. Chivers (Ed.), Malayan Forest 
Primates (pp. 147–165). New York, NY: Plenum.   
Angst, W. (1974). Das Ausdrucksverhalten des Javaneraffen Macaca fascicularis Raffles. 
Eine Einführung. Berlin and Hamburg: Paul Parey. 
Angst, W. (1975). Basic data and concepts on the social organization of Macaca fascicularis. 
In L. A. Rosenblum (Ed.), Primate Behavior:Developments in Field and Laboratory 
Research, Vol. 4 (pp. 325–388). New York, NY: Academic Publishing. 
Aureli, F. (1992). Post-conflict behaviour among wild long-tailed macaques (Macaca 
fascicularis). Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 31, 329–337.  
Aureli, F., Das, M. & Veenema, H. C. (1997). Differential kinship effect on reconciliation in 
three species of macaques (Macaca fascicularis, M. fuscata, and M. sylvanus). 
Journal of Comparative Psychology, 111, 91-99. 
Cords, M. (1992). Post-conflict reunions and reconciliation in long-tailed macaques. Animal 
Behaviour, 44, 57–61.  
Das, M., Penke, Z., & van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. (1997). Affiliation between aggressors and 
third parties following conflicts in long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis). 
International Journal of Primatology, 18, 157-179. 
De Ruiter, J. & Geffen, E. (1998). Relatedness of matrilines, dispersing males and social 
groups in long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis). Proceedings of the Royal 
Society Biological Sciences, 285, 79–87.  
De Ruiter, J., van Hooff, J. & Scheffrahn, W. (1995). Social and genetic aspects of paternity 
in wild long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis). Behaviour, 129, 203–224.  
Dittus, W. (2004). Demography: A window to social evolution. In: B. Thierry, M. Singh, & W. 
Kaumanns (Eds.), Macaque societies: A model for the study of social organization 
(pp. 87-112). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Fittinghoff, N. A., & Lindburg, D. G. (1980). Riverine refuging, in East Bornean Macaca 
fascicularis. In D. G. Lindburg, (Ed.), The macaques: Studies in ecology, behavior, 
and evolution, (pp. 182–214). New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
Fooden, J. (1995). Systematic review of southeast Asian longtail macaques, macaca 
fascicularis (Raffles, [1821]). Fieldiana, Zoology New Series, 81, 1-206. 
Palombit, R. A. (1992). A preliminary study of vocal communication in wild long-tailed 
macaques (Macaca fascicularis). I. Vocal repertoire and call emission. International 
Journal of Primatology, 13, 143-82. 
Palombit, R. A. (1992). A preliminary study of vocal communication in wild long-tailed 
macaques (Macaca fascicularis). II. Potential of calls to regulate intragroup spacing. 
International Journal of Primatology, 13, 183–207. 
Poirier, F. E., & Smith, E. O. (1974). The crab-eating macaques (Macaca fascicularis) of 
Angaur Island, Palau, Micronesia. Folia Primatologica, 22, 258-306. 
Tobin, H., Logue, A. W., Chelonis, J. J., Ackerman, K. T., & May III, J. G. (1996). Self-control 
in the monkey Macaca fascicularis. Animal Learning and Behavior, 24, 168-174. 
van Noordwijk, M. A. (1985). Sexual behaviour of Sumatran long-tailed macaques (Macaca 
fascicularis). Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie, 70, 277–296. 
van Noordwijk, M. A., & van Schaik, C. P. (1987). Competition among female long-tailed 
macaques (Macaca fascicularis). Animal Behaviour, 35, 577–589. 
van Schaik, C. P., van Amerongen, A. & van Noordwijk, M. A. (1996) Riverine refuging by 
wild Sumatran long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis). In W. C. McGrew, T. 
Nishida, L. F. Marchant, J. E. Fa & D. G. Lindburg (Eds.), Evolution and Ecology of 
Macaque Societies (pp. 160-182). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Uher, J., Werner, C. S., & Gosselt, K. (2013). From observations of individual behaviour to social representations  
of personality: Developmental pathways, attribution biases, and limitations of questionnaire methods.  
Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 647–667. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.03.006 
 
www.primate-personality.net  
31/44
van Schaik, C. P., van Noordwijk, M. A., de Boer, R. J., & den Tonkelaar, I. (1983). The 
effect of group size on time budgets and social behavior in wild long-tailed 
macaques. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 13, 173–181.  
Veenema, H. C., Spruijt, B. M., Gispen, W. H., & van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. (1997). Aging, 
dominance history, and social behavior in Java monkeys (Macaca fascicularis). 
Neurobiology of Aging, 18, 509-515. 
Wheatley, B. P. (1980). Feeding and ranging of east Bornean Macaca fascicularis. In D. G. 
Lindburg (Ed.), The macaques: Studies in ecology, behavior, and evolution (pp. 
215-246). New York, NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold.  
Yeager, C. P. (1996). Feeding ecology of the long-tailed macaque (Macaca fascicularis) in 
Kalimantan Tengah, Indonesia. International Journal of Primatology, 17, 51-62. 
 
Uher, J., Werner, C. S., & Gosselt, K. (2013). From observations of individual behaviour to social representations  
of personality: Developmental pathways, attribution biases, and limitations of questionnaire methods.  
Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 647–667. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.03.006 
 
www.primate-personality.net  
32/44
References 
 
Altmann, J. (1974). Observational study of behavior: Sampling methods. Behaviour, 49, 
229–267. 
Angst, W. (1974). Das Ausdrucksverhalten des Javaneraffen Macaca fascicularis Raffles. 
Eine Einführung. Berlin und Hamburg: Paul Parey. 
Arro, G. (2013). Peeking into personality test answers: Inter- and intraindividual variety in 
item interpretations. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 47, 56-76.  
Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions of personality. The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 41, 258–290.  
Asendorpf, J. B. (1988). Individual response profiles in the behavioral assessment of 
personality. European Journal of Personality, 2, 155-167. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182. 
Belyaev, D. K. (1969). Domestication of animals. Science Journal (U.K.), 5, 47–52. 
Biesanz, J. C., & Human, L. J.  (2010). The cost of forming more accurate impressions: 
Accuracy motivated perceivers see the personality of others more distinctively but 
less normatively. Psychological Science, 24, 589-594.    
Blaffer-Hrdy, S. (2009). Mothers and others: the evolutionary origins of mutual 
understanding. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press. 
Block, J. (2010). The five-factor framing of personality and beyond: Some ruminations. 
Psychological Inquiry, 21, 2–25. 
Bock, P. K. (2000). Culture and personality revisited. American Behavioural Scientist, 44, 32-
40. 
Brown, D. E. (1991). Human universals. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Capitanio, J. P. (1999). Personality dimensions in adult male rhesus macaques:  Prediction 
of behaviors across time and situation. American Journal of Primatology, 47, 299-
320. 
Cervone, D., Shadel, W. G., & Jencius, S. (2001). Social-cognitive theory of personality 
assessment. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 33-51. 
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112, 155-159.  
Daston, L. & Galison, P. (2007). Objectivity. New York, NY: Zone Books. 
Diamond, J. (2002). Evolution, consequences and future of plant and animal domestication. 
Nature, 418, 700–707. 
Diriwächter, R., Valsiner, J. & Sauck, C. (2004). Microgenesis in making sense of oneself: 
Constructive recycling of personality inventory items. Forum Qualitative 
Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 6, Art. 11.  
Dunbar, R. (1996). Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Furr, R. M. (2009). Personality psychology as a truly behavioural science. European Journal 
of Personality, 23, 369-401.  
Germonpré, M., Sablin, M. V., Stevens, R. E., Hedges, R. E. M, Hofreiter, M., Stiller, M., & 
Després, V. R. (2009). Fossil dogs and wolves from Palaeolithic sites in Belgium, 
the Ukraine and Russia: Osteometry, ancient DNA and stable isotopes. Journal of 
Archaeological Science, 36, 473-490. 
Gillespie, A. & Zittaun, T. (2010). Studying the moment of thought. In A. Toomela & J. 
Valsiner (Eds.), Methodological thinking in psychology: 60 years gone astray? (pp. 
69-88). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.  
Goldberg, L. R. (1981). Language and individual differences: The search for universals in 
personality lexicons. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of Personality and Social 
Psychology: Vol. 2 (pp. 141-165). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.  
Grice, J. W. (2001a). A comparison of factor scores under conditions of factor obliquity. 
Psychological Methods, 6, 67-83.  
Uher, J., Werner, C. S., & Gosselt, K. (2013). From observations of individual behaviour to social representations  
of personality: Developmental pathways, attribution biases, and limitations of questionnaire methods.  
Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 647–667. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.03.006 
 
www.primate-personality.net  
33/44
Grice, J. W. (2001b). Computing and evaluating factor scores. Psychological Methods, 6, 
430-450.  
Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research and Teaching (2006). 
Issued by Elsevier and incorporated by reference into the Animal Behavior Guide 
for Authors. Animal Behavior, 71, 245-253. 
Gumert, M. D., Kluck, M., & Malaivijitnond, S. (2009). The physical characteristics and usage 
patterns of stone axe and pounding hammers used by long-tailed macaques in the 
Andaman Sea region of Thailand. American Journal of Primatology, 71, 594–608. 
Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Peng, K., & Greenholtz, J. (2002). What's wrong with cross-
cultural comparisons of subjective Likert scales?: The reference-group effect. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 903-918. 
Hume, D. (1757/1957). The natural history of religion. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press.  
John, O. P., Angleitner, A., & Ostendorf, F. (1988). The lexical approach to personality: A 
historical review of trait taxonomic research. European Journal of Personality, 2, 
171-203. 
Jovchelovitch, S. (2007). Knowledge in context: Representations, community and culture. 
London, UK: Routledge. 
Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs (Vol. 1 and 2). New York, NY: 
Norton. 
King, J. E., Weiss, A., & Sisco, M. S. (2008). Aping humans: Age and sex effects in 
chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and human (Homo sapiens) personality. Journal of 
Comparative Psychology, 122, 418-27. 
Komatsu, K. (2012). Temporal reticence of the self: who can know my self? Integrative 
Psychological and Behavioral Science, 46, 357-372. 
Lahlou, S. (1996). Propagation of social representations. Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 26, 157-175. 
Lahlou, S. (2001). Functional aspects of social representations. In K. Deaux & G. Philogene 
(Eds.), Representations of the social: Bridging theoretical traditions, (pp. 131-146). 
Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Lahlou, S. (2008). L’Installation du Monde: De la représentation à l’activité en situation. Aix-
en-Provence, Université de Provence: Habilitation à Diriger des Recherches en 
Psychologie, 375.  
Lamiell, J. T. (2003). Beyond individual and group differences: Human individuality, scientific 
psychology, and William Stern’s critical personalism. Thousand Oaks, California: 
Sage Publications.  
Lewin, K. (1935). A dynamic theory of personality. Selected papers. New York, NY: McGraw-
Hill. 
Locke, J., (1689/1975). Essay concerning human understanding. Book II. (chapter 32). 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
MacDonald, D. W. (2001). The New Encyclopedia of Mammals. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.  
McAdams, D. P. (1994). A psychology of the stranger. Psychological Inquiry, 5, 145-148. 
Michell, J. (1997). Quantitative science and the definition of measurement in psychology. 
British Journal of Psychology, 88, 355–383.  
Michell, J. (2000). Normal science, pathological science and psychometrics. Theory & 
Psychology, 10, 639–667. 
Michell, J. (2003). The quantitative imperative: Positivism, naïve realism and the place of 
quantitative methods in psychology, Theory & Psychology, 13, 5–31. 
Millikan, R. (1993). White queen psychology and other essays for Alice. Bradford, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Uher, J., Werner, C. S., & Gosselt, K. (2013). From observations of individual behaviour to social representations  
of personality: Developmental pathways, attribution biases, and limitations of questionnaire methods.  
Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 647–667. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.03.006 
 
www.primate-personality.net  
34/44
Mischel, W. (1977). The interaction of person and situation. In: D. Magnusson, & N. S. 
Endler (Eds.), Personality at the crossroads: Current issues in interactional 
psychology (pp. 333-352). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1994). Personality psychology has two goals: Must it be two 
fields? Psychological Inquiry, 5, 156-158. 
Moscovici, S. (1984) The phenomenon of social representations. In R. M. Farr & S. 
Moscovici (Eds.), Social representations (pp. 3-70). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Neuman, Y., Turney, P. D., & Cohen, Y. (2012), How language enables abstraction: A study 
in computational cultural psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral 
Science, 46, 129-145. 
Omi,Y. (2012). Tension between the theoretical thinking and the empirical method: Is it an 
inevitable fate for psychology? Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 
46, 118-127. 
Park, B. (1986). A method for studying the development of impressions of real people. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 907-917. 
Pederson, A. K., King, J. E., & Landau, V. I. (2005). Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) 
personality predicts behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 39, 534-549. 
Peirce, C. S. (1902/1958). The simplest mathematics (CP 4.227-323). In Collected papers of 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-1935), Vol. 4, C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (eds.), 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Pillai, P. (2012). Cultural directions and origins of everyday decisions. Integrative 
Psychological and Behavioral Science, 46, 235-242. 
Rosenbaum, P. J., & Valsiner, J. (2011). The un-making of a method: From rating scales to 
the study of psychological processes. Theory & Psychology, 21, 47-65. 
Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: How the questions shape the answer. American 
Psychologist, 54, 93–105. 
Sherman, J. W. & Klein, S. B. (1994). The development and representation of personality 
impressions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 972-983. 
Shrout, P. E., & Fleiss, J. L. (1979). Intraclass correlations: Uses in assessing rater 
reliability. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 420-428.  
Stern, W. (1911). Die Differentielle Psychologie in ihren methodischen Grundlagen 
[Differential Psychology in its methodological foundations]. Leipzig: Barth. 
Stevenson-Hinde, J., Stillwell-Barnes, R., & Zunz, M. (1980). Individual differences in young 
rhesus monkeys: consistency and change. Primates, 21, 498-509. 
Thurstone, L. L. (1935). The vectors of mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Toomela, A. (2008). Variables in psychology: A critique of quantitative psychology. 
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 245-265.  
Toomela, A. (2009). How methodology became a toolbox – and how it escapes from that 
box. In J. Valsiner, P. Molenaar, M. Lyra, and N. Chaudhary (Eds.), Dynamic 
process methodology in the social and developmental sciences (pp. 45 - 66). New 
York, NY: Springer  
Toomela, A. (2011). Travel into a fairy land: A critique of modern qualitative and mixed 
methods psychologies. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 45, 21-
47. 
Trendler, G. (2009). Measurement theory, psychology and the revolution that cannot 
happen. Theory and Psychology, 19, 579-599. 
Trut, L. N. (1999). Early canid domestication: The farm-fox experiment. American Scientist, 
87, 160–169. 
Uher, J. (in preparation-a). What is behaviour? And (when) is language behaviour? A meta-
theoretical definition. 
Uher, J. (in preparation-b). Meta-theoretical foundations of objectivity versus subjectivity in 
quantifications of behaviour and personality. 
Uher, J., Werner, C. S., & Gosselt, K. (2013). From observations of individual behaviour to social representations  
of personality: Developmental pathways, attribution biases, and limitations of questionnaire methods.  
Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 647–667. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.03.006 
 
www.primate-personality.net  
35/44
Uher, J. (submitted for publication). Methodological approaches to taxonomies of human 
personality differences: The Behavioural Repertoire x Environmental Situations 
Approach - A non-lexical alternative. 
Uher, J. (2008a). Comparative personality research: Methodological approaches. European 
Journal of Personality, 22, 427-455.  
Uher, J. (2008b). Three methodological core issues of comparative personality research. 
European Journal of Personality, 22, 475-496.  
Uher, J. (2011a). Individual behavioral phenotypes: An integrative meta-theoretical 
framework. Why 'behavioral syndromes' are not analogues of 'personality'. 
Developmental Psychobiology, 53, 521–548.  
Uher, J. (2011b). Personality in nonhuman primates: What can we learn from human 
personality psychology? In A. Weiss, J. King, & L. Murray (Eds.), Personality and 
Temperament in Nonhuman Primates (pp. 41-76). New York, NY: Springer.  
Uher, J. (2013). Personality psychology: Lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait 
concepts reveal only half of the story—Why it is time for a paradigm shift. 
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 47, 1-55. DOI: 10.1007/s12124-
013-9230-6 
Uher, J., & Asendorpf, J. B. (2008). Personality assessment in the Great Apes: Comparing 
ecologically valid behavior measures, behavior ratings, and adjective ratings. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 821-838.  
Uher, J., Addessi, E., & Visalberghi, E. (2013). Contextualised behavioural measurements of 
personality differences obtained in behavioural tests and social observations 
in adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal of Research in Personality. 
Uher, J., Asendorpf, J. B., & Call, J. (2008). Personality in the behaviour of great apes: 
Temporal stability, cross-situational consistency and coherence in response. Animal 
Behaviour, 75, 99-112.  
Valsiner, J. (1998). The guided mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Valsiner, J. (2012). A guided science: History of psychology in the mirror of its making. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Veltkamp, G. M., Recio, G., & Jacobs, A. M., & Conrad, M. (2012). Is personality modulated 
by language?  Evidence from bilinguals’ NEO-FFI scores. International Journal of 
Bilingualism. Published online before print April 16 ,2012, 
doi:10.1177/1367006912438894. 
Visalberghi, E., & Fragaszy, D. (1990). Food-Washing behaviour in tufted capuchin 
monkeys, Cebus apella, and crabeating macaques, Macaca fascicularis. Animal 
Behaviour, 40, 829-836.  
Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Wagner, W., Farr, R., Jovchelovitch, S., Lorenzi-Cioldi, F., Marková, I., Duveen, G., & Rose, 
D. (1999). Theory and method of social representations. Asian Journal of Social 
Psychology, 2, 95-125. 
Wagoner, B. (2009). The experimental methodology of constructive microgenesis. In: J. 
Valsiner, P. Molenaar, N. Chaudhary, and M. Lyra (Eds.). Handbook of dynamic 
process methodology in the social and developmental sciences (pp. 99-121). New 
York, NY: Springer. 
Wagoner, B., & Valsiner, J. (2005). Rating tasks in psychology: From static ontology to 
dialogical synthesis of meaning. In A. Gülerce, I. Hofmeister, G. Saunders, & J. 
Kaye (Eds.), Contemporary theorizing in psychology: Global perspectives (pp. 197–
213). Toronto, Canada: Captus. 
Weber, M. (1949). The methodology of the social sciences (E. Shils & H. Finch, Trans., 
Eds.). New York, NY: Free Press. 
Westen, D. (1996). A model and a method for uncovering the nomothetic from the 
idiographic: An alternative to the Five-Factor Model. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 30, 400–413. 
Wundt, W. M. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology. London, UK: Allen.  
Uher, J., Werner, C. S., & Gosselt, K. (2013). From observations of individual behaviour to social representations  
of personality: Developmental pathways, attribution biases, and limitations of questionnaire methods.  
Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 647–667. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.03.006 
 
www.primate-personality.net  
36/44
Tables 
 
Table 1  Test-retest reliability of the behavioural composite measures on the level of BRxES-
Approach-generated working constructs 
 
Working construct t1-t2 t3-t4 t5-t6 
Aggressiveness to group 
members .30 (.006) .45 (<.001) .09 (.243) 
Anxiousness .22 (.032) .29 (.013) .25 (.030) 
Arousability .48 (<.001) .79 (<.001) .80 (<.001) 
Cleanliness .51 (<.001) .76 (<.001) .55 (<.001) 
Curiousness .89 (<.001) .75 (<.001) .79 (<.001) 
Dominance .10 (.215) .39 (.001) .05 (.361) 
Gregariousness .50 (<.001) .77 (<.001) .93 (<.001) 
Impulsiveness .24 (.025) .63 (<.001) .13 (.232) 
Playfulness .71 (<.001) .87 (<.001) .87 (<.001) 
Sexual activity .75 (<.001) .50 (<.001) .73 (<.001) 
Social orientation to group 
members .68 (<.001) .40 (.001) .68 (<.001) 
Third-party intervention - - .23 (.058) 
Mean .49 .60 .51 
 
Note. Pearson correlations r based on n = 70 individuals in t1-t2; n = 60 individuals in t3-t4; 
and n = 34-58 individuals in t5-t6 (in Study year 3, some measures were obtained in only one 
group). Significant correlations are bold; one-sided p values in parentheses.
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Table 2 Average interrater and test-retest reliability of the observer judgements on trait-adjective items (TA) and behaviour-descriptive verb 
(BV) items of the Macaque Personality Inventory for captive populations (MPIc) across Study waves – Summative statistics 
 
Item format Interrater reliability 
 Experts Novices The two rater groups combined 
  t1 t2 t3 t6 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t1 t2 t3 t6   
 ICC(3,k) 
Trait-adjectives  .59 .59 .61 .60 .64 .66 .57 .69 .69 .65 .72 .75 .72 .73   
Behaviour- 
descriptive verbs 
.66 .52 .66 .63 .65 .64 .52 .60 .60 .63 .75 .73 .69 .70   
All items .63 .55 .64 .62 .65 .65 .54 .64 .64 .64 .74 .74 .70 .71   
                
 ICC(3,1) 
Trait-adjectives  .43 .43 .46 .45 .50 .50 .42 .54 .54 .49 .41 .46 .41 .42   
Behaviour- 
descriptive verbs  
.50 .39 .51 .47 .49 .49 .36 .45 .45 .47 .45 .42 .37 .38   
All items  .48 .40 .49 .46 .49 .49 .38 .49 .49 .48 .44 .43 .39 .40   
                 
 Test-retest reliability r 
 Experts Novices The two rater  
groups combined 
Cross-correlations between the two rater groups 
 t1-t2   t1-t2 t3-t4 t5-t6 t1-t2 Experts t1- 
Novices t2 
Novices t1- 
Experts t2 
Experts t3- 
Novices t4 
Novices t5- 
Experts t6 
Trait-adjectives .76 - - .53 .49 .54 .75 .56 .51 .62 .59 
Behaviour- 
descriptive verbs 
.79 - - .47 .37 .52 .73 .59 .51 .65 .58 
All items .78 - - .49 .42 .52 .74 .54 .52 .60 .59 
 
Note. Interrater reliability: The ICC(3,k) scores for expert ratings and novice ratings are based on k = 2 raters in each Study wave; those of the 
combined ratings of both rater groups are based on k = 4 raters. Across all Study waves, scores for expert ratings are based on n = 34 to 97 
macaque individuals, those of novice ratings and of the combined ratings of both rater groups are based on n = 34 to 49 macaque individuals 
(see Section 2.6). Test-retest reliability: Single item correlations for expert ratings and combined ratings are based on n = 45, and for novice 
ratings on n = 40 in t1-t2; on n = 24 in t3-t4; and on n = 49 in t5-t6.  
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Table 3 Cross-method coherence and mediation analyses on the level of the BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs 
 
Coherence between methodsa Mediation analyses between methodsb Working constructs 
EO-BV BV-TA EO-TA EO-(BV)-TA BV-(EO)-TA 
Aggressiveness to group 
members 
.58 (<.001) .90 (<.001) .61 (<.001) .15 (<.001) .80 (<.001) 
Arousability .31 (.003) .16 (.050) .20 (.038) .25 (.039) -.15 (.215) 
Anxiousness .54 (<.001) .73 (<.001) .48 (<.001) .10 (.246) .70 (<.001) 
Cleanliness .46 (<.001) .73 (<.001) .54 (<.001) .24 (.003) .65 (<.001) 
Competitiveness -- -- .78 (<.001) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Curiousness .26 (.011) .87 (<.001) .23 (.023) .00 (.952) .86 (<.001) 
Distractibility -- -- .76 (<.001) -- -- -- --   
Dominance .52 (<.001) .81 (<.001) .41 (<.001) .00 (.968) .80 (<.001) 
Gregariousness .61 (<.001) .78 (<.001) .51 (<.001) .02 (.779) .79 (<.001) 
Impulsiveness .42 (<.001) .27 (.003) .46 (<.001) .40 (.001) .13 (.248) 
Physical activity -- -- .93 (<.001) -- -- -- --   
Persistence -- -- -.35 (1.00) -- -- -- --   
Playfulness .77 (<.001) .95 (<.001) .82 (<.001) .19 (.008) .81 (<.001) 
Sexual activity .39 (<.001) .79 (<.001) .53 (<.001) .23 (<.001) .75 (<.001) 
Social orientation to 
group members 
.37 (<.001) .28 (.002) .00 (.996) -.12 (.296) .34 (.006) 
Social orientation to 
youngsters 
-- -- .55 (<.001) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Third-party intervention -- -- .90 (<.001) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Vigilance -- -- .78 (<.001) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Note. Methods: EO – behavioural composite construct measures obtained in ethological observations, TA –  trait-adjective ratings, BV –  behaviour-
descriptive verb ratings. Mediation analyses: EO-BV – Correlations of predictors (EO) with potential mediators (BV); EO-TA – Correlations of predictors (EO) 
with potential criteria (TA); EO-(BV)-TA – Regression coefficients of predictors (EO) on criteria (TA) controlled for mediators (BV); BV-(EO)-TA –regression 
coefficients of mediators (BV) on criteria (TA) controlled for predictors (EO). Correlations of trait-adjective ratings and behaviour-descriptive verb ratings 
based on N = 104, correlations with behavioural composite construct measures based on n = 78. Significant coefficients are bold; p values in parentheses 
(correlations one-sided, regression coefficients two-sided). a Pearson correlations r; b Standardised regression coefficients β in multiple regression equations.
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Table 4 Intercorrelation matrices of behavioural composite measures of BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs in Study years 1 and 2 
 
Working constructs PL CU IM AR AG SX GR SO AX DO SC 
Playfulness  PL  .25 (.056) .36 (.004) .07  (.589) .06 (.621) -.05 (.724) -.08 (.560) -.31 (.017) -.02 (.900) .55 (.000) -.07 (.603)
Curiousness CU .33 (.005)   .49 (.000) .45 (.000) .28 (.027) .45 (.000) -.18 (.171) -.22 (.086) .21 (.098) .12 (.371) .00 (.973)
Impulsiveness  IM .46 (.000) .48 (.000)  .30 (.012) .43 (.000) .08 (.516) -.01 (.937) -.06 (.669) .23 (.076) -.01 (.945) -.10 (.424)
Arousability AR .15 (.212) .54 (.000) .26 (.044)  .50 (.000) .38 (.002) .00 (.974) -.30 (.020) -.15 (.249) .10 (.428) .14 (.269)
Aggressiveness to 
group members 
AG .13 (.290) .21 (.081) .41 (.000) .48 (.000)  .38 (.003) .32 (.012) .12 (.339) .12 (.343) -.16 (.222) .02 (.905)
Sexual activity  SX .18 (.130) .55 (.000) .38 (.001) .52 (.000) .49 (.000)  -.08 (.559) -.06 (.667) .10 (.464) -.11 (.417) -.08 (.530)
Social orientation to 
group members  
SO .12 (.325) .13 (.267) .40 (.001) .48 (.000) .75 (.000) .48 (.000)  .21 (.077) -.09 (.508) -.15 (.264) .29 (.025)
Gregariousness  GR -.16 (.175) -.26 (.027) -.17 (.157) -.20 (.101) .00 (.990) -.01 (.918) .39 (.002)  .52 (.000) -.40 (.001) -.30 (.019)
Dominance DO -.18 (.141) .07 (.582) -.02 (.894) -.19 (.119) .01 (.910) -.03 (.788) -.21 (.083) .36 (.002)  -.57 (.000) -.51 (.000)
Anxiousness AX .43 (.000) .17 (.153) .17 (.151) -.03 (.796) -.18 (.141) .02 (.876) .01 (.940) -.25 (.039) -.36 (.004)  .12 (.375)
Cleanliness  SC .07 (.543) .16 (.184) .22 (.063) .58 (.000) .50 (.000) .17 (.160) .49 (.000) -.24 (.045) -.29 (.014) .25 (.036)  
 
Note. BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs sorted by their interrelations as reflected in the rating factor scores. Below diagonal 
intercorrelations from Study year 1 based on n = 71 macaque individuals; above diagonal intercorrelations from Study year 2 based on n = 61 
macaque individuals. Pearson correlations r; significant correlations (p < .05; two-sided) are bold. Highlighted cells indicate associations 
between working constructs that are reflected in the four-factorial rating structure. 
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Table 5 Exploratory factor analysis of observer judgements on trait-adjective ratings (TA) and behaviour-descriptive verb ratings (BV) using the 
Macaque Personality Inventory for captive populations (MPIc): Item contents, assignments to the BRxES-Approach-generated working 
constructs, factor loadings, and communalities  
 
Working construct Item 
formata 
Item content (abbreviated) Rating factors Item 
communality 
   Playful-
active-
curious 
Aggressive-
competitive 
Prosocial-
gregarious 
Assertive-
nonanxious 
 
Playfulness TA Playful .91 -.25 .10 .05 .91 
 BV Plays alone, also with objects .96 -.29 -.12 .13 .86 
 BV Plays with his/her group members .89 -.24 .07 .10 .85 
Curiousness TA Curious .87 -.06 .07 .14 .82 
 BV Inspects and touches new objects .90 .02 -.12 .10 .75 
 BV Ignores new objects -.89 .01 .06 -.17 .77 
Physical activity TA Physically active .92 .00 -.01 .00 .84 
 BV Walks or brachiates .93 .02 -.11 -.02 .81 
 BV Sits or lays around -.85 -.18 .02 .12 .78 
Social orientation to 
youngsters 
TA Friendly to youngsters .41 -.42 .22 .10 .42 
 BV Plays with youngsters .81 -.26 .18 .05 .80 
Distractibility TA Distractible .78 -.06 -.02 -.29 .69 
 BV Lets him/herself easily interrupt in 
his/her activities 
.69 -.19 -.04 -.33 .60 
Vigilance TA Vigilant .55 .32 .00 -.06 .45 
 BV Spots small changes quickly .69 .25 .06 -.01 .62 
Arousability TA Excitable .59 .44 .10 -.40 .72 
Impulsiveness TA Impulsive .82 .23 .06 .03 .82 
Aggressiveness to 
group members 
TA Aggressive -.15 .88 .05 .04 .78 
 BV Threatens or chases others -.09 .88 .13 .03 .79 
 BV Hits or bites others -.06 .84 .15 -.01 .71 
Competitiveness TA Competitive .29 .83 .10 .01 .88 
 BV Tries to get others’ food or social 
partners  
.44 .57 .12 .18 .71 
Third-party 
intervention 
 
TA Intervening -.22 .84 -.03 .11 .77 
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 BV Tries to avoid getting involved in 
others' conflicts 
.00 -.74 -.21 -.23 .74 
 BV Supports others who are involved in a 
conflict 
-.24 .84 .06 -.05 .70 
 BV Tries to settle disputes among others -.10 .60 -.25 .05 .44 
Sexual activity TA Sexually active -.05 .75 -.16 -.20 .58 
 BV Tries to contact others sexually .02 .76 -.23 -.12 .61 
 BV Stimulates him/herself sexually .34 .32 -.30 -.21 .30 
Dominance TA Dominant -.01 .76 .08 .37 .86 
Social orientation to 
group members 
TA Friendly to group members .21 -.50 .18 .05 .32 
Anxiousness BV Stays away from unknown objects or 
persons 
.06 -.76 .12 -.38 .82 
Impulsiveness BV Shakes trees, jumps on or slaps 
others all of a sudden 
.09 .74 -.05 .23 .68 
Persistency TA Persistent .31 .62 -.05 .36 .73 
Gregariousness TA Gregarious .04 -.07 .90 -.09 .80 
 BV Spends much time alone .01 -.20 -.83 -.05 .76 
 BV Sits next to others -.01 .01 .87 .12 .83 
Social orientation to 
group members 
BV Approaches others, touches and also 
grooms them 
.02 .13 .78 -.13 .60 
 BV Has bodily contact with others .00 .01 .88 .09 .83 
Social orientation to 
youngsters 
BV Takes care of youngsters by 
grooming or embracing them 
-.26 .30 .48 -.33 .27 
Dominance BV Can select the best place .10 .47 .11 .61 .80 
 BV Makes way for others, displays bared 
teeth 
-.05 -.38 -.06 -.70 .78 
Anxiousness TA Anxious -.07 -.26 .03 -.82 .82 
 BV Screams quickly, urinates and has at 
times also diarrhoea in conflict 
situations 
.01 .00 .01 -.72 .52 
 
Note. Based on mean ratings aggregated across 4 raters from the two rater groups for N = 104 macaque individuals, principal axis factoring, 
and promax rotation. a Item format: TA - Trait-adjective item, BV - Behaviour-descriptive verb item. Factor loadings ≥ .40 in absolute value are 
bold. 
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Table 6 Correlations between behavioural composite measures of BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs and rating factor scores  
 
 Rating factor scores 
Behavioural composite measures of working 
constructs  
Playful-active-
curious 
Aggressive-
competitive 
Prosocial-
gregarious 
Assertive-
nonanxious 
Playfulness .81 (<.001) -.08 (.491) .49 (<.001) .16 (.172) 
Arousability .02 (.871) .29 (.009) -.05 (.637) .20 (.083) 
Curiousness .25 (.024) .34 (.002) -.14 (.208) .18 (.113) 
Impulsiveness .45 (<.001) .28 (.012) .26 (.023) .14 (.225) 
Aggressiveness to group members .10 (.393) .63 (<.001) .13 (.265) .28 (.013) 
Sexual activity .08 (.487) .51 (<.001) .02 (.857) .20 (.079) 
Gregariousness .10 (.372) .02 (.873) .57 (<.001) .37 (.001) 
Social orientation to group members .06 (.575) .36 (.001) .27 (.017) .11 (.358) 
Anxiousness .31 (.006) -.33 (.003) -.12 (.277) -.51 (<.001) 
Dominance .09 (.424) .21 (.061) .33 (.003) .63 (<.001) 
Cleanliness -.04 (.714) .05 (.656) -.12 (.294) -.06 (.621) 
 
Note. BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs sorted by their interrelations as reflected in the rating factor scores. Pearson correlations 
r based on n = 78 individuals. Significant correlations are bold, two-sided p values in parentheses. 
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Table 7 Associations of demographic factors with the macaques’ individual-specific behaviours studied with ethological observations (EO) and 
their reflection in the observers’ representations studied with behaviour-descriptive verb ratings (BV) and trait-adjective ratings (TA) on the level  
of BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs 
Working constructs Age Male Social rank 
Measure EO BV TA EO BV TA EO BV TA 
Aggressiveness to 
group members 
-.08 (.490) .04(.664) .10(.245) -.14(.020) -.23(.100) -.25 (.004) .53(.000) .72(.000) .72 (.000) 
Arousability -.06 (.614) .02(.847) -.56(.000) .20(.104) .14(.246) .01 (.924) .25(.037) -.34(.006) .45 (.000) 
Anxiousness -.32 (.002) .02(.777) -.07(.413) .21(.039) .06(.438) -.08 (.346) -.44(.000) -.79(.000) -.70 (.000) 
Cleanliness -.05 (.654) .00(.976) -.10 (.434) .10(.418) -.34(.007) -.21 (.091) .06(.624) -.05(.692) .26 (.037) 
Competitiveness 
- -.42(.000) -.30 (.001) - -.14(.144) -.12 (.168) - .67(.000) .75 (.000) 
Curiousness -.03 (.726) -.64(.000) -.57(.000) .60(.000) .39(.000) .35 (.000) .20(.043) .20(.010) .23 (.000) 
Distractibility 
- -.50(.000) -.60 (.000) - .10(.328) .07 (.510) - -.17(.112) .02 (.881) 
Dominance .18 (.109) 
-.04(.623) -.02(.784) .16(.152) -.06(.452) -.11 (.112) .40(.001) .81(.000) .87 (.000) 
Gregariousness -.02 (.890) 
-.10(.375) -.12(.335) -.19(.126) -.00(.972) -.06 (.605) .18(.027) .44(.000) .33 (.007) 
Impulsiveness -.14 (.253) 
-.03(.733) -.52(.000) .30(.013) .03(.741) .08 (.408) .15(.194) .74(.000) .38 (.000) 
Physical activity 
- -.72(.000) -.67 (.000) - .19(.020) .24 (.004) - .22(.010) .22 (.012) 
Persistence 
- .57(.000) -.24 (.014) - .11(.317) -.10 (.280) - -.27(.011) .69 (.000) 
Playfulness -.41 (.001) -.63(.000) -.57(.000) .26(.020) .37(.000) .39 (.000) .05(.656) -.01(.908) -.03 (.722) 
Sexual activity -.06 (.640) 
-.13(.212) -.13(.270) .03(.826) .29(.009) -.12 (.314) .24(.056) .43(.000) .42 (.001) 
Social orientation to 
group members 
-.13 (.286) -.17(.150) -.05(.672) -.24(.042) -.07(.578) .39 (.001) .36(.003) .38(.001) -.15 (.196) 
Social orientation to 
youngsters 
- -.37(.002) -.35 (.001) - .19(.108) .48 (.000) - .18(.125) -.12 (.207) 
Third-party 
intervention 
- -.09(.304) -.04 (.623) - -.29(.001) -.28 (.002) - .75(.000) .75 (.000) 
Vigilance - -.64(.000) -.50 (.000) - .16(.054) .09 (.376) - .43(.000) .44 (.000) 
Note. EO – Behavioural composite construct measures obtained in ethological observations; BV – Behaviour-descriptive verb ratings 
aggregated on the level of the BRxES-Approach generated working constructs; TA – Trait-adjective ratings. Standardised regression 
coefficients β in multiple regression equations. Significant coefficients are bold; two-sided p values in parentheses. Data from Study year 1 
based on n = 69. 
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Table 8 Stability of behavioural composite measures of BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs and of rating factor scores across 12 
and 24 months 
 
Type of construct measure 12-month stabilities 24-month stabilities 
  Study years 1→2 Study years 2→3 Study years 1→3 
Behavioural composite measures of working constructs 
 Playfulness .86 (<.001) -.04 (.574) -.04 (.577) 
 Arousability .35 (.003) .46 (.004) .46 (.005) 
 Curiousness .75 (<.001) .83 (<.001) .66 (<.001) 
 Impulsiveness .46 (<.001) .50 (.002) .75 (<.001) 
 Aggressiveness to group 
members .60 (<.001) .64 (<.001) .67 (<.001) 
 Sexual activity .47 (<.001) .60 (<.001) .85 (<.001) 
 Gregariousness .51 (<.001) .50 (.002) .42 (.011) 
 Social orientation to 
group members .50 (<.001) .71 (<.001) .76 (<.001) 
 Anxiousness .63 (<.001) .35 (.025) .55 (.001) 
 Dominance .31 (.009) .68 (<.001) .75 (<.001) 
 Cleanliness .19 (.073) .72 (<.001) .49 (.003) 
 Mean .54  .57  .61  
Rating factor scores 
 Playful-active-curious .93 (<.001) .68 (<.001) .73 (<.001) 
 Aggressive-competitive .75 (<.001) .59 (<.001) .56 (<.001) 
 Prosocial-gregarious .59 (<.001) .60 (<.001) .41 (.001) 
 Assertive- nonanxious .65 (<.001) .52 (.002) .40 (.002) 
 Mean .77  .60  .54  
 
Note. BRxES-Approach-generated working constructs sorted by their interrelations as reflected in the rating factor scores. Pearson correlations 
r for stability analyses between Study years 1→2 are based on n = 59 individuals and between Study years 2→3 on n = 30-31 for both 
behavioural measures and rating factor scores. Stability correlations between Study years 1→3 are based on n = 30 for behavioural measures 
and on n = 53 for rating factor scores. Significant correlations are bold; one-sided p values in parentheses. 
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